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WILL, JUDGMENT, AND ECONOMIC LIBERTY: MR.
JUSTICE SOUTER AND THE MISTRANSLATION OF
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
ALAN J. MEESE*
Among other things, the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the
deprivation of "liberty" without "due process of law."1 To many,
the Due Process Clause means what it says, that is, it merely
requires states to follow certain procedures before depriving
someone of liberty.2 Others, however, maintain that the clause
* Associate Professor of Law and Fellow, Institute of Bill of Rights Law, Wil-
liam and Mary School of Law. A.B., The College of William and Mary, J.D., The
University of Chicago. Neal Devins, John McGinnis and Cynthia Ward provided
helpful comments. James Scott and Kerry Hubers provided helpful research assis-
tance. Finally, the College of William and Mary supported this project with a gener-
ous summer research grant.
L U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[Nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.").
2 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SE-
DUCTION OF THE LAW 31-32 (1990); ANTONIN ScALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION
24-25 (1997); Frank Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 85,
90-91 (1982); Learned Hand, Due Process of Law and the Eight Hour Day, 21 HARV.
L. REV. 495, 495-96 (1908). See generally John Harrison, Substantive Due Process
and the Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L. REV. 493, 501 (1997) ('ITihere is a time-hon-
ored objection to the very idea of substantive due process. The objection is that the
'process' referred to in the Clause is procedure.").
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has a "substantive" component that limits the authority of the
state over certain rights, even if fair procedures have been em-
ployed to abridge them.'
Of course, a conclusion that the Due Process Clause provides
substantive protection for certain liberties begs two important
questions: which liberties, and how much protection? The logical
place to begin, it might seem, would be with the meaning at-
tached to the Due Process Clause when the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was written and ratified. An investigation of that meaning,
many have argued, would reveal that the Framers and Ratifiers
believed that the phrase "liberty" referred to the right to con-
tract and the right to pursue an occupation-rights that were
subject to abridgement only in certain narrow circumstances.4
Still, for decades, the Supreme Court has refused to offer even
the slightest protection for liberty of contract and liberty of occu-
pation under the aegis of the Due Process Clause.5 Similarly,
many influential scholars embrace the distinction drawn by
modern constitutional doctrine between economic liberties and
so-called personal rights.6 Predictably, this bifurcation between
economic and other rights has led to the charge that the Su-
3. See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 536-45 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(discussing the right to privacy); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1302-12 (1988) (same).
4. See, e.g., BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION
(1980); Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the
Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 LAW & HIST. REV. 293,
296 (1985); see also infra notes 76-90 (discussing various primary sources).
5. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732-33 (1963) (sustaining a Kan-
sas statute that barred non-lawyers from debt adjusting); Williamson v. Lee Optical,
348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) (upholding an Oklahoma statute that prohibited opticians
from fitting or duplicating lenses without a prescription); Olsen v. Nebraska, 313
U.S. 236 (1941) (sustaining a Nebraska statute fixing private employment agency
fees); see also Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court:
An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 34, 43-45 (describing the "dual
standard" applied to economic and personal rights).
6. See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 153-59 (1991);
LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF 24-90 (1996)
(endorsing enterprise of substantive due process and rejecting protection for economic
liberties); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 40-67 (1993); TRIBE, supra
note 3, at 564-86. Of course, there are exceptions, that is, scholars who would em-
ploy substantive due process in furtherance of economic liberties. See, e.g., SIEGAN,
supra note 4, at 318-26.
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preme Court and the scholars who endorse this bifurcation have
invoked substantive due process selectively, in furtherance of
value choices not discernible from the Constitution.7
For those few scholars who subscribe to the theory of "consti-
tutional moments," this charge is easy to rebut. As they see
things, the Due Process Clause was effectively amended in
1937.8 This amendment did not take the form required by Arti-
cle V. Instead, "The People," after significant mobilization and
political deliberation, rejected the protection accorded economic
liberties in substantive due process decisions such as Adkins v.
Children's Hospital9 and Lochner v. New York.1" The Supreme
7. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 514-15 (1965) (Black, J., dissent-
ing) (rejecting the majority's finding of a guarantee to the right of marital privacy in
the penumbra of the Bill of Rights); BORK, supra note 2, at 223-25 (agreeing with
Professor Siegan that "economic liberties are no different, from a judicial point of
view, from other freedoms not mentioned in the Constitution that the modem Court
does not see fit to protect"); LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 206 (1960)
(questioning distinction between personal rights and property rights); SIEGAN, supra
note 4, at 248-64, 318-31; Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and
Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823, 828-29 (1986) (arguing that consistent
application of the rationale of privacy decisions would also require protection for eco-
nomic liberties); McCloskey, supra note 5, at 45-54 ("[W]e are left with a judicial
policy which rejects supervision over economic matters and asserts supervision over
'personal rights'; and with a rationale, so far as the written opinions go, that might
support withdrawal from both fields but does not adequately justify the discrimina-
tion between them."); Bernard H. Siegan, Separation of Powers & Economic Liberties,
70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 415, 473 (1995) ("Establishing the priority of liberties is a
political judgment involving the distribution of benefits on a subjective basis. This is
a matter of political policy and not judicial administration.").
8. The chief proponent of this view, of course, is Professor Ackerman. See 1
ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 47-57. Others have jumped on the bandwagon. See, e.g.,
James Gray Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the
American Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 304-05 (1990) (broadening
Professor Ackerman's approach to investigate the role of direct popular power gener-
ally). Moreover, long before Professor Ackerman announced his theory, others had
concluded that, regardless of the original meaning of the Constitution, the New Deal
Court could not resist indefinitely the sustained Popular opposition to its decisions.
See, e.g., OWEN J. ROBERTS, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 61 (1969) ("Looking
back, it is difficult to see how the Court could have resisted the popular urge for
uniform standards throughout the country.. . ."); McCloskey, supra note 5, at 53
("No doubt the Court was presumptuous to imagine, before 1937, that it could hold
back such waves as the wage-control movement or the demand for social security.").
9. 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (voiding minimum wage law as inconsistent with liberty
of contract).
10. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (voiding maximum hour law as inconsistent with liberty
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Court confirmed this amendment, it is said, in West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish" and United States v. Carolene Products Co.,' in
which the Court abandoned aggressive protection for liberty of
contract and liberty of occupation respectively."3 Thus, even if
decisions such as Lochner and Adkins were faithful renderings
of the Fourteenth Amendment's original meaning, these scholars
say, the events of 1937 superseded that meaning.'4 Because this
purported "amendment" did not repudiate substantive due pro-
cess as such, nothing about it was inconsistent with recognition
of non-economic liberties, 15 such as the so-called right of privacy
announced in Griswold v. Connecticut 6 and applied in subse-
quent decisions, such as Roe v. Wade. 17
Many scholars have rejected the theory of constitutional mo-
ments.' Moreover, while scholars can speak of constitutional
moments, judges cannot. Whatever their true interpretive theo-
ries, our legal culture ensures that judges at least purport to
explain their decisions as faithful interpretations of our written
Constitution, a document that does not always include the
"amendments" produced by constitutional moments. 9 In so do-
of contract).
11. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
12. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
13. See 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 119-30; see also Carolene Prods., 304 U.S.
at 154; West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 391 (overruling Adkins v. Children's Hasp.,
261 U.S. 525 (1923)).
14. See 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 66 ("Lochner might have been constitu-
tionally plausible in 1905 ... .
15. See id. at 150-58.
16. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
17. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
18. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A
Critique of Professor Bruce Ackerman's Theory of Constitutional Moments, 44 STAN.
L. REV. 759 (1992) (book review) (rejecting Ackerman's view); Suzanna Sherry, The
Ghost of Liberalism Past, 105 HARV. L. REV. 918 (1992) (book review) (criticizing
Ackerman's approach); see also BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT:
THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 9-138 (1998) (arguing that the
Court's abandonment of protection for economic liberties was the result of the natu-
ral doctrinal evolution driven by changed economic circumstances); Lawrence Lessig,
Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN L. REV. 395, 448-51,
453-61 (1995) (questioning the theory of constitutional moments and providing an al-
ternate account of the New Deal).
19.
Supreme Court Justices and other federal judges always try to justi-
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ing, they must rely upon the traditional sources of meaning:
text, structure, and history.20 They must appear to exercise judg-
ment, rather than will, implementing decisions not their own.21
Because the purported Constitutional Moment of 1937 did not
produce any changes in constitutional text, we would not expect
judges to explain the repudiation of Lochner and Adkins by
invoking the "amendment" of 1937. Moreover, scholars wishing
to influence judicial doctrine must provide an account of 1937
that is consistent with common conceptions about the judicial
role.
Still, without relying upon any theory of constitutional mo-
ments, the Supreme Court has invoked substantive due process
to protect certain personal rights, while at the same time abjur-
ing any protection for economic liberties.2 Similarly, many schol-
fr their decisions by writing opinions that appeal to the constitution-
al text, to history, and to prior caselaw. Such appeals are what the
Justices' employers-the American people-expect from their Court.
They think this is the proper way in which judges should go about
interpreting and understanding the Constitution.
Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution: A Comment on Pro-
fessor Lessig's Theory of Translation, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1435, 1455 (1997).
Of course, in some instances, the Constitution does at least appear to include
textual results of constitutional moments, results that were not adopted pursuant to
the procedures outlined in Article V. See 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 81 (asserting
that the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in a manner inconsistent with the
procedures mandated by Article V). The purported Moment of 1937, however, pro-
duced no such text.
20. This is not to say it is physically impossible. During the nineteenth century,
a southern gentleman could refuse a challenge to a duel. He would not do so, how-
ever. See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. Cmi. L. REv.
943, 969-70 (1995).
21. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-79 (1803); THE FEDER-
ALIST No. 78, at 437 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Krammick ed., 1987) (arguing that,
in conducting judicial review, judges must exercise 'judgment," not "Wil").
22. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (holding that liberty
of occupation is not a "fundamental right" for purposes of equal protection review);
Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (same); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot
Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947) (same). Compare Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702, 752-65 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (recounting roots of substantive due pro-
cess), and Planned Parenthood of Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861-62 (1992)
(joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (justifying the Court's choice to
abandon the protection of liberty of contract), and Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990) (announcing right to refuse medical treatment),
and Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-500 (1977) (protecting
grandmother's right to live with her grandchildren), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
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ars endorse the judicial bifurcation between economic and other
liberties without embracing the theory of constitutional mo-
ments.3 Without the figleaf of a constitutional moment, scholars
and jurists who support the current dichotomy between econom-
ic and other rights must offer some other explanation for their
selective invocation of substantive due process. They must ex-
plain why some forms of liberty, such as privacy, find shelter in
the Constitution, while other forms, such as the right to pursue
an occupation, may be trammeled by the legislature at will. The
absence of such an explanation, or, what may be worse, the
provision of an explanation that will not withstand scrutiny,
suggests that the distinction between personal rights and eco-
nomic rights, and, with it, the legitimacy of the enterprise of
substantive due process, is an illusion.
Some scholars and jurists have risen to this challenge, at-
tempting to justify the bifurcation between economic and other
liberties without relying upon the purported occurrence of a
constitutional moment. What has emerged is a dominant ac-
count of, and justification for, the bifurcation between economic
and other liberties. This account does not question the Framers'
117 (1973) (citing with approval the dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,
76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting), while at the same time announcing a right to
abortion), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (announcing the
so-called "right of privacy"), with Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732-33 (1963)
(upholding state statute restricting the practice of debt adjusting solely to lawyers),
and Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) (upholding state statute
prohibiting opticians from making lenses without a prescription), and Olsen v. Ne-
braska, 313 U.S. 236, 240 (1941) (upholding statute restricting the maximum com-
pensation that an employment agency may collect from an applicant). Indeed, some
Justices have gone so far as to reject economic liberties explicitly protected by the
Constitution's text, while at the same time embracing expansive protection for per-
sonal liberties under the aegis of substantive due process. Justice Brennan, for in-
stance, would have given states carte blanche to demand real property as a condi-
tion of receiving government benefits, such as a zoning permit. See Nollan v. Califor-
nia Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 843-45 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (conclud-
ing that such conditions should be judged under a rational basis test). In contrast,
however, he argued that the Court should apply strict scrutiny when reviewing stat-
utes conditioning receipt of medicaid funds on the recipients agreement not to use
such funds to purchase an abortion. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 482-90 (1977)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
23. See, e.g., SEIDMAN & TUSHNET, supra note 6, at 45-48; SUNSTEIN, supra note
6, at 40-67; TRIBE, supra note 3, at 581-86.
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commitment to economic liberty, including liberty of contract
and liberty of occupation. Instead, it asserts that the repudiation
of Lochner in particular and economic liberty in general can be
described as a faithful application or "translation" of the Four-
teenth Amendment's original principles in light of changed con-
ditions that characterize the modern economy.2 Thus, even if
Lochner and its progeny were correct when decided, it is argued,
the Court properly jettisoned these decisions in 1937, when
changes in economic conditions called into question the factual
premises on which the protection of economic liberty had rest-
ed.25
Perhaps the most complete judicial justification of the bifurca-
tion between economic and other rights can be found in two
relatively recent opinions authored by Justice Souter: Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 6 and Washington v. Glucksberg.27 Taken
together, these opinions mount a comprehensive defense of the
enterprise of substantive due process, while at the same time
insisting that economic liberties should receive no protection
under the Due Process Clause.28 In mounting this defense, Jus-
tice Souter did not question the commitment of the Framers to
economic liberty. Nor did he claim that 1937 had produced a de
facto amendment of the Due Process Clause. Instead, he argued
that changed economic circumstances had justified-indeed,
required-the Court to abandon liberty of contract and liberty of
occupation in 1937. Thus, he concluded, the distinction between
24. See HOWARD GJLLAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED (1993); TRIBE, supra
note 3, at 578-79; Lessig, supra note 18, at 454-61 (arguing that rejection of liberty
of contract by the New Deal Court can be explained as a "translation" of the
Fourteenth Amendment's original principles in light of changed economic facts); see
also CUSHMIAN, supra note 18, at 9-138 (characterizing the Court's repudiation of eco-
nomic liberty as natural doctrinal evolution driven by changed economic circumstanc-
es); infra notes 113, 127-34 and accompanying text (describing similar views held by
other academics). See generally Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L.
REv. 1165 (1993) (sketching theory of interpretive translation). This translation-based
justification, it should be noted, is not of modem origin, but has roots that predate
1937 itself. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454 (1909).
25. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 3, at 573-75.
26. 505 U.S. 833, 861-62 (1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter,
JJ.).
27. 521 U.S. 702, 752-65 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring).
28. See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
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economic and other liberties that characterizes the modern in-
carnation of "substantive due process" is the product of a "rea-
soned judgment," faithful to the principles that originally ani-
mated the Due Process Clause.2 9
This Article offers a critique of the dominant account of the
judicial bifurcation between economic and other liberties. In so
doing, this Article focuses on Justice Souter's opinions in
Glucksberg and Casey, opinions that provide a convenient vehi-
cle for understanding and examining the dominant account.
These opinions suggest or adumbrate several bases for "translat-
ing" the Due Process Clause in a manner that explains and
justifies the Supreme Court's refusal to protect economic liberty.
This Article examines these translations, each of which has been
articulated and refined by various scholars, and finds them
insufficient to justify the repudiation of liberty of contract. Some
of these translations depend upon false assertions about the
economic consequences of industrialization." Others depend
upon a threshold misunderstanding of the principles that neces-
sarily inform any constitutional protection for liberty of con-
tract.3 ' Far from applying the principle behind liberty of contract
in light of new circumstances, the various translations examined
here repudiate that principle altogether.
Moreover, even when taken on their own terms, none of the
translations suggested by Justice Souter and others justifies the
modern bifurcation between economic and other liberties. More
precisely, even if one or more of these translations provides a
persuasive justification for abandoning liberty of contract, none
of them even purports to justify the wholesale abdication of the
Court's obligation to protect other economic liberties, in particu-
lar, liberty of occupation. Instead, at the most, each translation
supports only the abandonment of those decisions voiding regu-
lation of wages and, perhaps, other incidents of the employment
relationship. While Justice Souter and others who subscribe to
the dominant account are to be commended for attempting to
justify the refusal to protect economic liberties, these attempts
29. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 755-73 (Souter, J., concurring).
30. See infra notes 150-70.
31. See infra notes 171-91.
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ultimately fall short. If the Due Process Clause contains a sub-
stantive component, the dominant account does not provide a
valid explanation for the differential treatment of economic
rights and so-called personal rights, such as the right of privacy.
Absent some new explanation for the refusal of courts to protect
"liberty" consistently, scholars and others will be forced to con-
clude that judges are not capable of implementing substantive
due process in a principled fashion or, in the alternative, that
1937 produced a constitutional amendment after all.
I. CASEY AND GLUCKSBERG AS EXAMPLES OF THE MODERN
POSITION
As suggested above, the dominant account of the modern
bifurcation between economic and other liberties rests upon
several assumptions. First, it rejects the assertion that "process
means process"--that is, the Due Process Clause contains no
substantive component.32 Second, it assumes, for the sake of
argument, that the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment un-
derstood the "liberty" encompassed by the Due Process Clause to
include liberty of contract and liberty of occupation. 3 Finally, it
rejects the assertion, made most notably by Professor Ackerman,
that the events of 1937 worked an amendment to the Constitu-
tion. Despite these various constraints, the scholars and jurists
who adhere to the dominant account maintain that the Due
Process Clause affords no protection to economic liberties such
as liberty of contract and liberty of occupation.
As noted above, Justice Souter, an unabashed supporter of
substantive due process, has offered the most sustained judicial
defense to date of the distinction between economic and personal
liberties, a defense consistent with that offered by several schol-
ars. This defense has appeared in Glucksberg34 and Casey.35 A
32. See Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on
Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1297
n.247 (1995).
33. See GILLMAN, supra note 24, at 1-60; SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 48; see also
infra notes 93-100 and accompanying text (highlighting Justice Souter's and Justice
Bradley's recognition of the Framers' expansive definition of liberty).
34. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 759-64.
35. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861-62 (1992) (joint opinion
1999]
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consideration of these opinions, it will be seen, provides an ex-
cellent vehicle for illuminating the current bifurcation between
economic and other liberties as well as the challenge that this
bifurcation poses to those who defend it. Moreover, an examina-
tion of these opinions reveals one possible answer to this chal-
lenge: the repudiation of economic liberty can be justified as a
translation of original values in light of new circumstances.
A. Planned Parenthood v. Casey
In Casey, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the central holding of
Roe v. Wade, 6 that women retain a substantial liberty interest
in choosing whether to carry a fetus to term.37 While two justices
would have reaffirmed Roe outright, three others-Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter-issued the controlling opinion,
an opinion rejecting Roe's controversial trimester framework. 8
This "joint opinion" was a quintessential exemplar of the current
approach to substantive due process, including the bifurcation
between economic and other rights. At the outset, the opinion
expressly rejected the claim that the Due Process Clause con-
tains no substantive component.3 9 Moreover, the opinion abjured
a constrained view of the "liberty" that should receive substan-
tive protection, in favor of a more open-ended approach to defin-
ing that term.40 Finally, the opinion insisted that such an ap-
proach to the Due Process Clause was consistent with the judi-
cial role.4 Judges, the opinion said, could and should exercise
"reasoned judgment" in defining the outer contours of liberty
when conducting substantive due process review, and could do
so without relying upon their own personal beliefs.42
of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.)
36. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
37. See id. at 154.
38. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 869-87 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter, JJ.).
39. See id. at 848-49.
40. See id. at 847-50. Justice Souter offered a similar analysis in Glucksberg. See
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 765-73 (Souter, J., concurring). For an alternate approach,
see Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721-23; Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6
(1989) (opinion of Scalia, J.) (arguing that the Due Proces Clause only protects liber-
ty historically recognized by society).
41. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 849-52.
42. See id. at 849.
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The opinion did not, however, assert that Roe had properly
applied the doctrine of substantive due process. Instead, in a
section apparently authored by Justice Souter, the joint opinion
held that, regardless of whether Roe had- been correct as an
initial matter, the doctrine of stare decisis required the reaffir-
mation of the decision's "central holding" absent some "special
reason" for abandoning it.' Mere disagreement with Roe's read-
ing of the Due Process Clause, these Justices said, could not con-
stitute such a "special reason" and thus did not justify repudia-
tion of it. 44
There was, of course, a rather obvious question posed by the
joint opinion's reliance on stare decisis to justify adherence to
Roe. After all, the Court had previously overruled other land-
mark decisions that had stood longer and been reaffirmed more
often than Roe.41 Perhaps most notably, in 1937, the Court over-
ruled Adkins v. Children's Hospital, and by implication Lochner,
in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish.46 Adkins had voided a mini-
mum wage law on the ground that it unduly infringed upon the
"liberty of contract" protected by Lochner.7 Thus, the West Coast
Hotel Court abandoned a principle-liberty of contract-that had
stood for over thirty years and been reaffirmed dozens of times.48
43. See id. at 864; see also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 842 (1991)
(Souter, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court should adhere to precedent absent
some "special justification" for abandoning it).
44. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 864.
45. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954) (overruling
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)); Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-
78 (1938) (overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842)).
46. See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (overruling Adkins
v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923)); see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 957-62
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the joint
opinion's stare decisis analysis was inconsistent with that employed in West Coast
Hotel).
47. See Adkins, 261 U.S. at 545-50 (relying upon Lochner several times for the
proposition that the Court's protection of liberty of contract was well-established and
settled).
48. See, e.g., Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 603 (1936)
(relying upon Adkins to void minimum wage law); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S.
161, 173-74 (1908) (relying upon Lochner to find "yellow dog" contracts sheltered by
liberty of contract). Lochner, of course, had been applied countless times by the
Court. See TRIBE, supra note 3, at 567 n.2 (noting that between 1899 and 1937 the
Court voided nearly 200 statutes on economic due process grounds).
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Nevertheless, the joint opinion in Casey endorsed West Coast
Hotel as a proper explication of the Due Process Clause.49 More-
over, the joint opinion asserted that its own approach- to stare
decisis was entirely consistent with West Coast Hotel's repudia-
tion of Adkins and the Lochner line of decisions.6° This assertion,
of course, required a description of West Coast Hotel that in-
volved something other than a mere disagreement with Lochner's
account of the original meaning of the Due Process Clause.
Thus, despite its endorsement of the modern bifurcation between
economic and other liberties, the Casey joint opinion did
not-and could not-assert that Lochner or Adkins improperly
read economic liberty into the Due Process Clause. Such an
account of these decisions would have exposed the Justices to
the charge that they were invoking stare decisis selectively, in
furtherance of their own predilections.51 Instead, the decision's
endorsement of West Coast Hotel's repudiation of economic liber-
ty had to rest on some other basis.
B. Washington v. Glucksberg
More recently, in Washington v. Glucksberg,52 the Court sus-
tained a Washington statute forbidding physicians to assist in
suicide.5" In a concurring opinion, Justice Souter gave the fullest
account of any sitting Justice of the source and limits of sub-
stantive due process.54 Unlike the joint opinion in Casey, which
simply relied upon precedent for the existence of this authority,
Justice Souter's concurrence in Glucksberg argued that, as a
matter of original meaning, the Clause's prohibition of depriva-
tions of liberty "without due process of law" not only guaranteed
49. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 861-62 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter,
JJ.).
50. See id. at 864.
51. It should be noted that this charge was made in any event. See id. at 961-
62 (joint opinion of Rehnquist, C.J., White, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ.) (asserting that
West Coast Hotel rested upon disagreement with Lochner's elevation of liberty of con-
tract to privileged constitutional status); cf West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 391 ("The
Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract.").
52. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
53. See id. at 735.
54. See id. at 759-73 (Souter, J., concurring).
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a certain level of procedural protection, but also prevented any
deprivation that was "arbitrary" in a substantive sense.5 Thus,
he concluded, the text of the Fourteenth Amendment imposed
upon the Court "an obligation to give substantive content to the
words 'liberty' and 'due process of law.'"56 Failure to discharge
that duty, he said, was inconsistent with the doctrine of judicial
review outlined in Marbury v. Madison.5"
Substantive due process, the Justice admitted, had produced
Dred Scott v. Sandford58 as well as what he called the "deviant
economic due process cases "59 exemplified by Lochner" and
Adkins.61 Appropriate respect for history, combined with judicial
restraint, he said, could avoid these mistakes.62 Decisions such
as West Coast Hotel,6" in which the Court sustained a minimrm
wage law," and United States v. Carolene Products Co.,65 in
which it sustained a prohibition on the sale of filled milk,6" the
Justice argued, evinced the proper level of protection for econom-
ic liberties.67
Like his reliance on stare decisis in Casey, Justice Souter's
invocation of Marbury raises an important question. According
to Marbury, courts are obliged to enforce the Constitution be-
cause it is the work of "The People" after significant delibera-
tion.6' That work, John Marshall said, placed limits on the au-
55. See id. at 759-60.
56. Id. at 764.
57. See id. at 763-64 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)).
58. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (holding that a former slave lacked standing to
sue).
59. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 761 (Souter, J., concurring).
60. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (voiding maximum hour law as violative of liberty to con-
tract).
61. 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (holding that statute requiring employers to pay a mini-
mum wage violated liberty of contract).
62. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 756 (Souter, J., concurring) ("[Tihe acknowledged
failures of some of these cases point with caution to the difficulty raised by the
present claim.").
63. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
64. See id. at 395.
65. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
66. See id. at 154.
67. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 761, 766 (Souter, J., concurring).
68. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176; Frank H. Easterbrook, The Influence
of Judicial Review on Constitutional Theory, in A WORKABLE GOVERNMENT? 170, 170-
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thority of government-limits the People meant for judges to
enforce.69 Those limits, in turn, are ascertained by discerning the
original meaning of the relevant constitutional text.70 After all,
the question in Marbury was not simply whether judges have
the power of judicial review; it was also, more mundanely and
precisely, whether section 13 of the Judiciary Act was inconsis-
tent with the meaning the Framers gave to Article 111.71 Mar-
shall answered this more discrete question by investigating the
original meaning of Article III.72 This investigation was an exer-
cise of judgment, not will.73
Justice Souter did not contest Marbury's vision of the ratio-
nale and limits of judicial review. To the contrary, he stated
that, in conducting substantive due process review, courts could
and should exercise "reasoned judgement," instead of creating
and imposing their own notions of liberty and the justifications
for abridging it.74 This embrace of Marbury's methodology would
seem to have important implications not only for the meaning of
"liberty," but also for the scope of state's authority to infringe it.
If courts derive their authority and obligation to undertake sub-
stantive due process review from the original meaning of the
71 (Burke Marshall ed., 1987) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Constitutional Theory]; see also
Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. Cm. L. REV. 349, 374-76
(1992) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Abstraction].
69. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177-79; THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 438-
39 (Alexander Hamilton) (Issac Kramnick ed., 1987); see also Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S.
(3 Dall.) 386, 398-99 (1798) (Iredell, J., concurring) (arguing that the existence of a
written constitution implies limits on legislative and judicial authority).
70. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177-80.
71. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Juris-
diction of the Supreme Court, 56 U. Ci. L. REV. 443, 453-98 (1989) (illustrating the
implications of Marbury on Congress's power to strip the federal judiciary of jurisdic-
tion).
72. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 174 (inquiring whether "it had been in-
tended to leave it in the discretion of the legislature to apportion the judicial power
between the supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that body").
73. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 438-39 (Alexander Hamilton) (Issac Kramnick
ed., 1987); DAVID CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST
HUNDRED YEARS 69-70 (1985) (arguing that Chief Justice Marshall lifted the ratio-
nale for judicial review articulated in Marbury from the Federalist Number 78,
without attribution).
74. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 738 (1997) (Souter, J., concur-
ring).
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Constitution, logic would seem to demand that judges must de-
rive the definition of "liberty" and "due process of law" from the
same source and in the same manner, that is, by ascertaining
what meaning the Framers gave to those terms.7 If courts must
define "liberty" capaciously because the Framers themselves did
so, should courts not also be bound by, or at least begin with,
the meaning the Framers gave to that phrase? Similarly, if
courts are bound by the Framers' belief that an "arbitrary" or
"undue" interference with liberty denies the deprived party of
"due process of law," should courts not feel bound by the
Framers' definition of "arbitrary"?
How, then, would those who wrote and ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment have defined "liberty"? Perhaps they would have
included the right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures, the right to keep and bear arms, and the right be free
from cruel and unusual punishments. Perhaps not. One thing,
however, seems certain, particularly after consulting the sources
on which Justice Souter relied for his conclusion that the Due
Process Clause contains a substantive component: the Framers
included within their understanding of "liberty" the right to
pursue one's occupation and to acquire and dispose of property
and labor.76 These Framers, after all, had recently fought a Civil
War to protect and expand a regime of "free labor," that is, the
right of an individual to own and dispose of his own labor and
entrepreneurial energy.7 7 Indeed, the Fourteenth Amendment
75. It is conceivable, of course, that the Framers intended to delegate to the
courts the authority to define "liberty" and "due process of law," with the result that
the meaning given those phrases by the Framers is beside the point. Justice Souter,
however, did not suggest that courts are the recipient of such a delegation. More-
over, it would seem that such a delegation would be inconsistent with the theory of
Marbury. See Easterbrook, Abstraction, supra note 68, at 373, 376-80. Further, none
of the scholars who have suggested that the repudiation of economic liberty can be
explained as a "translation" of original principles has repudiated Marbury or suggest-
ed that the Due Process Clause was meant as a delegation of the authority to de-
rive the meaning of "liberty" or "due process of lawI " independent from the original
meaning of those phrases. See generally Lessig, supra note 24, passim (arguing that
interpretive translation is a method of assuring fidelity to the original meaning of
constitutional provisions).
76. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
77. See William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law
in the Guilded Age, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 767, 774-79.
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was a reaction to the so-called Black Codes, which denied oppor-
tunities to southern blacks, including the ability to own and
dispose of property, and to make and enforce contracts."8
Moreover, as Justice Souter noted, next to Dred Scott, the
most important substantive due process decision issued before
the Civil War was "the famous Wynehamer case." 9  In
Wynehamer, the New York Court of Appeals held that a statute
outlawing a previously legitimate business deprived the business
owner in question of his property without due process of law."
Similarly, Thomas Cooley, whom Justice Souter cited as authori-
ty for the existence of substantive due process, had this to say in
1868 about the meaning of liberty:
[Ihf the legislature should undertake to provide that persons
following some specified lawful trade or employment should
not have capacity to make contracts, or to receive conveyanc-
es, or to build such houses as others were allowed to erect, or
in any other way to make such use of their property as was
permissible to others, it can scarcely be doubted that the act
would transcend the due bounds of legislative power, even if
it did not come in conflict with express constitutional provi-
sions. The man or the class forbidden the acquisition or en-
joyment of property in the manner permitted to the commu-
nity at large would be deprived of liberty in particulars of
primary importance to his or their "pursuit of happiness.""'
78. More precisely, the Fourteenth Amendment apparently was designed to pro-
vide a constitutional basis for the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which "provided that
blacks were to enjoy the same rights as whites with regard to property ownership,
contract, court access, and protection of the law." Michael J. Klarman, Race and the
Court in the Progressive Era, 51 VAND. L. REV. 881, 937-38 (1998); see EARL M.
MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863-1869, at 38, 79-81
(1990); Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding of the Segregation Decision
69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12-13, 16-17, 46-47, 56-58 (1955); see also Aremona G. Bennett,
Phantom Freedom: Official Acceptance of Violence to Personal Security and Subver-
sion of Proprietary Rights and Ambitions Following Emancipation, 1865-1910, 70
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 439, 445-47, 453-55 (1994) (describing judicial decisions and Black
Code provisions which denied southern blacks protection of occupational liberty and
the right to contract).
79. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 757 (Souter, J., concurring).
80. See Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 420 (1856) ("[A] law which should
make it a crime for men either to live in, or rent, or sell their houses, would fall
within the same prohibition of legislative authority."); see also SIEGAN, supra note 4,
at 45 (calling Wynehamer "the leading pre-Civil War decision on due process at the
state level").
81. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 393
[Vol. 41:3
WILL, JUDGMENT, AND ECONOMIC LIBERTY
Finally, Justice Bradley's dissent in the Slaughter-House Cas-
es, from which Justice Souter took the requirement that legisla-
tion interfering with liberty be non-arbitrary, argued that the
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause included the right to
pursue one's chosen calling. 2 Thus, while the joint opinion in
Casey suggested West Coast Hotel should have accepted the
principle of economic liberty simply for reasons of stare decisis,
Justice Souter's Glucksberg concurrence embraced authorities
suggesting the principle was correct as an original matter. 3
Of course, the mere fact that "liberty" encompasses the right
to pursue a calling or the right to contract does not necessarily
mean that Lochner or similar cases were decided correctly. One
still needs a theory for determining whether a deprivation of
that liberty comports with due process of law. According to Jus-
tice Souter, any deprivation of liberty or property deemed "arbi-
trary" could not be due process of law."
How, though, is a court to determine whether a deprivation is
"arbitrary"? Here again, the sources on which Justice Souter
relied for the proposition that the Due Process Clause contains a
substantive component suggest a provocative answer. According
to Justice Bradley's dissent in the Slaughter-House Cases, for in-
stance, the state can deprive a citizen of the right to pursue a
calling only if that deprivation constitutes a valid exercise of the
police power.8" Thomas Cooley reached the same conclusion,
adding that any abridgement of liberty designed simply to fur-
ther the interest of one group at the expense of another would
(Da Capo Press 1972) (1868). According to Professor Corwin, this work was "the
most influential treatise ever published on American constitutional law." EDWARD S.
CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMEN'f. THE RISE, FLOWERING, AND DECLINE OF A
FAMIOUS JURIDICAL CONCEPT 116 (1978); see also CLYDE E. JACOBS, LAW WRITERS
AND THE COURTS (1954).
82. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 119-20 (1873)
(Bradley, J., dissenting); see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 755-73 (Souter, J., concur-
ring) (arguing that the Due Process Clause forbids "arbitrary" deprivations of liber-
ty).
83. No proponent of the dominant account has argued that the meaning of liber-
ty did not include liberty of occupation and liberty of contract.
84. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 758-59 (Souter, J., concurring).
85. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 119-20 (Bradley, J., dissent-
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not be in furtherance of a public purpose and thus would be
void.86 Finally, several decisions cited by the Justice as evidence
of the widespread acceptance of substantive due process during
the nineteenth century reached the same conclusion. 7
As explained in one of those decisions, the police power was
defined and limited by the ancient maxim-sic utere tuo alienum
non laedas--one should not use property in a manner that
harms another.88 To a modern economist, then, this power con-
sisted of the ability to counteract "externalities."89 In a passage
often quoted in early substantive due process cases, Chancellor
Kent wrote:
The government may, by general regulations, interdict such
uses of property as would create nuisances and become dan-
gerous to the lives, or health, or comfort of the citizens. Un-
wholesome trades, slaughterhouses, operations offensive to
the senses, the deposit of powder, the application of steam
power to propel cars, the building with combustible mate-
rials, and the burial of the dead, may be interdicted by law,
in the midst of dense masses of population, on the general
and rational principle that every person ought so to use his
property as not to injure his neighbors, and that private
interests must be made subservient to the general interests
of the community.90
86. See COOLEY, supra note 81, at 437.
87. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113
(1877); Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. 129 (1874). Justice Souter cited each of these
decisions as evidence that substantive due process was widely accepted in the late
nineteenth century. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 759-60 (Souter, J., concurring); see
also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (relying upon Mugler for
the proposition that "for at least 105 years . . . the Clause has been understood to
contain a substantive component").
88. See Munn, 94 U.S. at 124-25:
[The] social compact . . . does authorize the establishment of laws
requiring each citizen to so conduct himself, and so use his own
property, as not unnecessarily to injure another. This is the very
essence of government, and has found expression in the maxim sic
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. From this source come the police
powers.
(emphasis added); see also GILLMAN, supra note 24, at 46-60 (describing development
of police power limitations in antebellum jurisprudence).
89. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 107-22 (1985); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN
LAW, 1836-1937, at 200-04 (1991).
90. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 276 (1827); see also Coin-
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Thus, it would seem, any abridgement of the right to pursue a
calling or to make a contract that does not fall within the police
power so defined is arbitrary and inconsistent with the meaning
attributed to the Due Process Clause by those authorities on
which Justice Souter relied.
Taken together, the joint opinion in Casey and Justice
Souter's concurrence in Glucksberg amount to a classic restate-
ment of the modern approach to substantive due process. Within
this rubric, the Due Process Clause does more than~guarantee
fair procedures; it also empowers courts to review the substance
of legislation. Moreover, the liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause includes more than the mere absence of physical re-
straint; it also includes certain activities deemed "fundamental"
and thus deserving of enhanced protection from legislative inter-
ference. Further, the importance of economic liberties to the
Framers is taken as a given: mere disagreement with Lochner
does not suffice to overrule it. Still, unlike personal rights such
as the right of privacy, economic rights are not deemed funda-
mental, but instead may be trammeled at will.
Each of the assumptions underlying the modern bifurcation
between economic and other liberties is certainly open to ques-
tion, although it is not my intent to do so here.91 My critique,
instead, is internal to both the notion of substantive due process
and the approach to this doctrine exemplified by Justice Souter's
opinions in Casey and Glucksberg9 2 The critique is a narrow
monwealth v. Tewksbury, 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 55, 59 (1846) (endorsing a similar con-
ception of the police power); COOLEY, supra note 81, at 706.
91. For instance, Justice Souter relied upon Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378
(1856), for the proposition that substantive due process was an accepted doctrine be-
fore the Civil War. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 757 (Souter, J., concurring). Yet, one
of the sources which the Justice cited several times with approval concluded that
the reaction of other state courts to Wynehamer was largely negative. See CORWIN,
supra note 81, at 107-15; see also State v. Paul, 5 R.I. 185, 197 (R.I. 1858) ("It is
obvious that [the argument for substantive due process] confounds the power of the
assembly to create and define an offence, with the rights of the accused to trial by
jury and due process of law."); Edward S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of
Law Before The Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 460, 474-75 (1911) ("[In the 1850s], the
Wynehamer decision found no place in the constitutional law that was generally rec-
ognized throughout the United States.").
92. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 761 (Souter, J., concurring) (referring to econom-
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one, and begins with the following straightforward question: If,
as Justice Souter and others contend, the Due Process Clause
prevents the arbitrary destruction of fundamental liberties, why
were the economic due process decisions, which protected liber-
ties apparently embraced by the Framers, "deviant" according to
Justice Souter? The answer given by Justice Souter is not sat-
isfactory.
II. EMBRACING A QUESTIONABLE BIFURCATION
Justice Souter was aware of the importance& that the Framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment placed on economic liberty. In-
deed, in Glucksberg, Justice Souter relied upon Justice Bradley's
dissent in the Slaughter-House Cases93 as evidence of the antiq-
uity of substantive due process. That dissent, Justice Souter
noted, argued that "a person's right to choose a calling was an
element of liberty (as the calling, once chosen, was an aspect of
property)" which could not be "arbitrarily assailed."9' It was
Bradley's opinion, and others like it, upon which courts would
come to rely for the protection of liberty of occupation and the
derivative liberty of contract.95 Indeed, in Allgeyer v. Louisiana,96
a unanimous Court relied upon the views of Justice Bradley in
holding that the Due Process Clause precluded abridgements of
liberty of contract outside the police power." According to Jus-
tice Souter, the Allgeyer principle was "unobjectionable.
ic due process cases as "deviant").
93. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 846 (1992) (relying upon Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), for the antiq-
uity of substantive due process).
94. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 759 (Souter, J., concurring) (citing the Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 116 (Bradley, J., dissenting)).
95. See State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179, 181-83 (1889) (relying upon Justice
Field's concurrence in Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 762
(1884)); In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98, 107 (1885) (relying upon concurrences of Justices
Field and Bradley in Butchers' Union Co.). See generally, Pound, supra note 24, at
470 n.83 (noting that the Supreme Court of Illinois "has fallen into the settled prac-
tice" of treating Justice Bradley's dissenting opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases as
though it were the majority opinion).
96. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
97. See id. at 589 (relying upon Justice Bradley's concurrence in Butchers' Union
Co., 111 U.S. at 762); see also Butchers' Union Co., 111 U.S. at 760-66 (Bradley, J.,
concurring) (reiterating his dissent in the Slaughter-House Cases).
98. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 760 (Souter, J., concurring).
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Lochner and its progeny, of course, depended upon this ac-
count of the original meaning of the phrase "liberty" and "due
process of law."9 Neither the joint opinion in Casey nor Justice
Souter's concurrence in Glucksberg questioned Lochner's as-
sumption that, as originally understood, the "liberty" encom-
passed by the Due Process Clause included liberty of occupation
and liberty of contract. Indeed, the Casey opinion emphasized
that the repudiation of liberty of contract in West Coast Hotel
could not have depended upon any mere disagreement with the
Lochner Court's reading of the Due Process Clause."
Still, like most other proponents of substantive due process,
Justice Souter made it clear that he would reject the aggressive
protection for economic liberty once mandated by Lochner and
its progeny.1"' Although he relied upon history and constitution-
al text for his assertion that the Due Process Clause has a sub-
stantive component, Justice Souter indicated he would ignore
these tools when it came to applying the doctrine in practice.
Any argument for substantive due process, it seems, must ex-
plain how this approach, which begins with the premise of judi-
cial review, is consistent with the underlying rationale for such
judicial authority in general, and the doctrine of substantive due
process in particular. Absent such an explanation, Justice Souter
and others who would employ substantive due process, but re-
fuse to protect economic liberty, can in no way be characterized
as exercising "reasoned judgment." Instead, these scholars and
jurists endorse an exercise of will, whereby judges employ their
authority selectively to further a conception of liberty untethered
to the text from which they purport to derive their authority."°2
In both Glucksberg and Casey, the Justice seemed acutely
aware of this possible criticism. In each opinion, he attempted to
99. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (relying upon Allgeyer for
existence of liberty of contract); supra note 97 (describing Algeyer's reliance on Jus-
tice Bradley's concurrence in Butchers' Union Co.).
100. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861-64 (1992).
101. See, e.g., supra notes 6-7, 24 (documenting rejection of economic liberty by
scholars supporting substantive due process).
102. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 849 (arguing that courts should apply "reasoned judg-
ment" in conducting substantive due process review); THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 437
(Alexander Hamilton) (Issac Kramnick ed., 1987) (asserting that, in exercising judi-
cial review, courts must exercise 'judgment7 and not "will").
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explain his refusal to recognize the sort of economic liberties
protected in Lochner and its progeny in light of his support for
an expansive reading of the Due Process Clause in other
contexts.l 3 There were a few straightforward ways out of this
conundrum. Justice Souter could have joined those Justices who
simply believe that judges are not bound by the original mean-
ing of the constitutional text.' Or, he could have claimed that,
whatever the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the events of 1937 had effectively amended the Constitution so
as to erase the sort of economic liberty apparently held dear by
the Framers.' Finally, he could have asserted that, as used in
the Due Process Clause, liberty did not include liberty of occupa-
tion or liberty of contract. Any of these explanations, of course,
would have preserved substantive due process, while at the
same time justifying the failure of the post-New Deal Court to
protect economic liberty.0 6
Justice Souter did not adopt any of these explanations in
Casey or Glucksberg. There was no reference to any "Constitu-
tional Moment," nor any claim that judges possess the power to
determine the meaning of liberty unconstrained by historical
meaning. Moreover, Justice Souter made no attempt in either
opinion to demonstrate that "liberty" as used in the Due Process
Clause did not include liberty of occupation or liberty of con-
tract. To the contrary, in Glucksberg, he stated that the account
of liberty provided in Allgeyer was "unobjectionable." 0 7 Never-
theless, he asserted that the refusal to protect economic liberties
was consistent with the Marbury-based interpretive methodology
that compelled him to employ substantive due process.'0 8 Despite
103. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 861-62 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter, JJ.); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 759-64 (Souter, J., concurring).
104. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Address at the Georgetown University Text
and Teaching Symposium (Oct. 12, 1985), in THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR
WRITrN CONSTITUTION (Federalist Soc'y 1986). See generally Easterbrook, Constitu-
tional Theory, supra note 68, at 175-76 (arguing that most modem approaches to
constitutional interpretation, while invoking Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137 (1803), are inconsistent with Marbury's rationale for judicial review).
105. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
107. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 760 (Souter, J., concurring).
108. See id. at 757-60. Of course, reliance upon Marbury is not necessarily incon-
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this assertion, however, he did not offer a comprehensive expla-
nation in either opinion as to why it was appropriate to repudi-
ate what he called the "deviant" economic due process deci-
sions. °9 Still, Justice Souter did suggest several directions that
such an explanation might take, directions parallel to those of-
fered by scholars who adhere to the dominant account. Regard-
less of the specific manner in which the Framers thought the
Fourteenth Amendment would be applied, Justice Souter sug-
gested that a translation of the Amendments principles in light
of new circumstances required the conclusion that the protection
of economic liberty was no longer appropriate. As shown below,
however, none of the "translations" suggested by Justice Souter
or scholars sympathetic to this approach survives careful scrutiny.
II. GLUCKSBERG AND THE ECHO OF DRED SCOTT
According to Justice Souter, the vice of cases recognizing eco-
nomic liberty was not their reliance upon substantive due pro-
cess as such, but instead their method of implementing that
doctrine."0 The economic due process cases were "deviant," he
said, because they were "the echo of Dred Scott" in the economic
realm."' Moreover, in their "absolutist" approach, these deci-
sions were "in the spirit of' the decision that had led to the Civil
War."1
This formed an interesting rhetorical strategy. Dred Scott, the
Justice had noted earlier in his opinion, had failed the judgment
sistent with a belief in constitutional moments. Indeed, Professor Ackerman himself
embraces Marbury. See 1 ACKEPhfAN, supra note 6, at 40-41; Kiarman, supra note
18, at 761 (noting that much of Ackerman's work is merely "a highfalutin reformula-
tion of views first articulated by Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No. 78 and by
Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury"). Reliance on Marbury, however, does not
ipso facto imply a belief that the Constitution can be amended without reliance upon
the procedures outlined in Article V. See Easterbrook, Abstraction, supra note 68, at
368; Klarman, supra note 18, at 761-62. Thus, Justice Souter's failure to avert to
the notion of constitutional moments should be taken as a rejection of that theory.
109. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 761 (Souter, J., concurring).
110. See id at 760 (Souter, J., concurring) (stating that the "principle" announced
in Allgeyer was "unobjectionable").
111. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
112. Id.
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of history. 3 His association of the methodology of Lochner with
the abominable decision that predated the war that had remade
the nation seemed to suggest that protection of liberty of con-
tract was in some sense out of place in twentieth-century Ameri-
ca. By harboring spirits like those that had animated the Dred
Scott Court, and mimicking---"echoing"-an approach to liberty
that predated that nation's greatest conflagration, the Lochner
Court attempted to bring the country to a place it already had
rejected resoundingly. Justices with an appreciation of history,
as well as the proper "spirit," would have been less "absolutist"
and avoided this sort of "deviancy."
Others, of course, have associated Lochner with Dred Scott,
albeit usually to treat both as object lessons against the general
enterprise of substantive due process." 4 Unfortunately, Justice
Souter-who embraced substantive due process---did not explain
just why he deemed Lochner the "echo" of Dred Scott. It is un-
clear, for instance, why he deemed Lochner the "echo" of Dred
Scott and not of Justice Bradley's dissent in the Slaughter-House
Cases, or of the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in
"the famous Wynehamer case."-"5 One can only speculate as to
what, exactly, Justice Souter had in mind. In light of his con-
cession that the "principle" of contractual liberty articulated in
Allgeyer was "unobjectionable," what "reasoned judgment" sup-
ported the equation of these two decisions? After all, the similar-
ity between Dred Scott and Lochner is not readily apparent.
Indeed, on the surface they are complete opposites. Dred Scott
held that a black man was not a human being, but was, instead,
chattel property, with his labor subject to the control of an "own-
er." 1 6 Lochner, on the other hand, held that individuals were
free to dispose of their own labor in any way that they saw fit,
113. See id. at 758 (Souter, J., concurring).
114. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 998 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); BORIC, supra note 2, at 83, 116, 131, 193, 209; William H. Rehnquist,
Observation-The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX L. REV. 693, 700-04
(1976).
115. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 757 (Souter, J., concurring) (relying upon Justice
Bradley's Slaughter-House dissent and Wynehamer as evidence for the antiquity of
substantive due process).
116. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 451-52 (1857).
[Vol. 41:3
WILL, JUDGMENT, AND ECONOMIC LIBERTY
constrained only by the police power.17 This distinction between
owning yourself and owning someone else was fundamental to
the American understanding of liberty when the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified." 8 As Abraham Lincoln put it during
the Civil War:
The world has never had a good definition of the word liber-
ty, and the American people, just now, are much in want of
one. We all declare for liberty; but in using the same word we
do not all mean the same thing. With some the word liberty
may mean for each man to do as he pleases with himself, and
the product of his labor; while with others the same word
may mean for some men to do as they please with other men,
and the product of other men's labor. Here are two, not only
different, but incompatible things, called by the same
name-liberty. And it follows that each of the things is, by
the respective parties, called by two different and incompati-
ble names-liberty and tyranny.1 9
Those who had sided with Lincoln, of course, won the battles
that entitled them to choose which definition of "liberty" the
country would embrace, as the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fif-
teenth Amendments confirm. Presumably any Justice serving on
the Supreme Court in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries understood this. Indeed, many early proponents of
economic substantive due process were committed abolitionists,
motivated by the free labor ideology animating the Republican
Party at the time. 0 Any "echoes" of Dred Scott, it seems, were
117. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) ("The right to purchase or
to sell labor is part of the liberty protected by this amendment, unless there are cir-
cumstances which exclude the right."); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 591
(1897) ("kIn the privilege of pursuing an ordinary calling or trade and of acquiring,
holding and selling property must be embraced the right to make all proper con-
tracts in relation thereto.").
118. See Jonathan A. Glickstein, 'Poverty Is Not Slavery'" American Abolitionists
and the Competitive Labor Market, in ANTISLAVERY RECONSIDERED 195 passim (Lewis
Perry & Michael Fellman eds., 1979).
119. Abraham Lincoln, A Good Definition of the Word Liberty, Address at Balti-
more, Maryland (Apr. 18, 1864), in MARIO CuOMO & HAROLD HOLZER, LINCOLN ON
DEMOCRACY 320-21 (1990).
120. See, e.g., Forbath, supra note 77, at 772-79; William E. Nelson, The Impact
of the Antislavery Movement upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century
America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513, 547-66 (1974). As these scholars explain, Justices
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found, not in the majority decisions of the Lochner Court but, in-
stead, in Justice Holmes's Lochner dissent, which would have
brooked all varieties of state control over the disposition of an
individual's labor, so long as such control was the outcome of
"dominant opinion."12' Justice Souter's equation of Lochner and
Dred Scott, it seems, falls a bit flat.
But wait. Perhaps the sort of close attention to history urged
by Justice Souter might suggest that the distinction between the
two cases, glaring as it may appear, is purely a formal one that
can be maintained only by "absolutists." After all, a Justice on
the Lochner Court who really knew his history would have re-
called not only the choice posited by Lincoln, but also the asser-
tion by southern slaveholders and others that the choice was a
false one, that is, that a northern factory worker who nominally
"owned" his labor but was subject to "wage slavery" was no bet-
ter off than a southern slave. 22 Perhaps then, the "liberty" pro-
tected in Lochner was, as a substantive matter, more like the
"liberty" protected in Dred Scott than the Lochner court seemed
to assume. Indeed, when Lochner was announced, the Socialist
Workers Party proclaimed it to be the new Dred Scott deci-
sion." ' A Court populated by the proper spirits, then, would
Field and Bradley, committed abolitionists who opposed Dred Scott, drew upon free
labor ideology in their dissenting opinions in the Slaughter-House Cases and concur-
rences in Butchers' Union. Moreover, Justice Brewer, a stalwart of the Lochner
Court, was a committed abolitionist. See Nelson, supra, at 552. As noted earlier, the
Slaughterhouse and Butchers' Union opinions formed the basis of subsequent protec-
tion of liberty of occupation and contract. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
Indeed, even Professor Sunstein, a committed opponent of Lochner, concedes that, in
light of the free labor ideology that infused the Civil War Amendments, "[pilausibly,
minimum wage and maximum-hour legislation thus offended the same principle that
doomed slavery." SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 48.
121. See, e.g., Lochner, 198 U.S. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[The word 'liber-
ty,' in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is held to prevent the natu-
ral outcome of a dominant opinion.").
122. Forbath, supra note 77, at 806-12; see also Abraham Lincoln, Fragments of a
Speech on Free Labor [hereinafter Lincoln, Fragments], reprinted in CUOMO &
HOLZER, supra note 119, at 159 ("We know, Southern men declare that their slaves
are better off than hired laborers amongst us.").
123. See The Worker, May 22, 1905, at 1. Similarly, when the Court struck down
a state's minimum wage in Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587
(1936), one member of Congress proclaimed "a new Dred Scott decision condemning
millions of Americans to economic slavery." 80 CONG. REC. 9040 (1936) (statement of
Rep. Fish); see also GILLMAN, supra note 24, at 153 ("[The so-called freedom of the
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have realized that the bakers in Lochner were analogous to
antebellum slaves and validated the state action taken to as-
suage their condition. Indeed, several scholars have associated
Dred Scott and Lochner on these grounds." We must assume
that Justice Souter had some reason for the equation of Lochner
and Dred Scott and the concomitant abandonment of economic
liberty. Recognition that wage labor was often quite helpless be-
fore capital seems to be the best possible defense of Justice
Souter's equation of the two decisions.
As a normative matter this might sound very appealing. Yet,
as a method of constitutional interpretation it leaves much to be
desired. After all, the opponents of abolition had made their
arguments-and they had lost. Lincoln championed not only the
liberty of a middle class merchant to ply his trade, but also the
liberty of a poor farmer to work his land for long hours and little
profit.1 5 Moreover, none of the sources cited earlier, on which
Justice Souter relied for the existence of substantive due pro-
cess, qualified the right to own and sell one's labor so as to ex-
clude wage laborers from its protection. 6 To reject Lochner on
dependent woman and child to work as long hours and under any conditions, no
matter what the danger to health and limb is, in truth, but abject slavery masquer-
ading under that name. Freedom means real liberty to choose.'" (quoting William F.
Willoughby, Address at the American Association for Labor Legislation (1914))); Dan-
iel R. Ernst, The Yellow Dog Contract and Liberal Reform, 1917-1932, 30 LAB. HIST.
251, 263-64 (1989) (reporting that opponents of yellow dog contracts analogized such
devices to chattel slavery). Other scholars, without mentioning slavery by name, ar-
gued that state action was necessary to enhance individual freedom vis-A-vis private
power. See, e.g., ALPHEUS T. MASON & WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE SUPREME COURT IN
A FREE SOCIETY 249 (1959) (characterizing Chief Justice Hughes's dissent in Tipaldo
as stating that "the right [of liberty] guaranteed by the Constitution can be infringed
by forces other than government, and that government may properly intervene to
safeguard the individual against them.").
124. See, e.g., SEIDMAN & TUSHNET, supra note 6, at 180; Michael Kent Curtis,
Two Textual Adventures: Thoughts on Reading Jeffrey Rosen's Paper, 66 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1269, 1287 n.115 (1998).
125. See Abraham Lincoln, Address Before the Wisconsin State Agricultural Soci-
ety (Sept. 30, 1859), in CUOMO & HOLZER, supra note 119, at 161 ("In these Free
States, a large majority are neither hirers nor hired. Men, with their fami-
lies-wives, sons and daughters-work for themselves, on their farms, in their hous-
es and in their shops, taking the whole product to themselves, and asking no favors
of capital, on the one hand, nor of hirelings or slaves, on the other.").
126. Lincoln, Fragments, supra note 122, at 159 ("Southern men declare that their
slaves are better off than laborers amongst us. How little they know.").
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the grounds set forth by Justice Souter would be to reject the
underlying normative principle embraced by the Framers as
reflected in the distinction posited by President Lincoln.
For those who adhere to "translation" as a method of constitu-
tional interpretation, there is more to this "substantive" attack
on economic liberty than meets the eye. Perhaps it is true that,
in 1868, those who wrote and would ratify the Fourteenth
Amendment saw a great distinction between wage labor and
slavery. Perhaps it is also true that they would have anticipated
the Lochner-style protection of liberty of occupation and liberty
of contract. By 1905, however, when Lochner was decided, the
American economy had changed drastically. The proliferation of
general incorporation statutes had facilitated the growth of large
aggregations of capital. 27 Individuals who once labored for small
firms or as independent yeoman farmers, shopkeepers, or mer-
chants, now worked for these huge concerns. 2 8 Any liberty pos-
sessed by the average worker or entrepreneur shortly after the
Civil War had been snuffed out by the industrial revolution. 9
Without this protection, workers were left without any real bar-
gaining power vis-h-vis their new masters. 130 In protecting "con-
tractual liberty," the Lochner Court assumed a world that was
no longer in existence.
Although he did not say so explicitly, Justice Souter, like
others who have equated Lochner and Dred Scott, may have
believed that less "absolutist" Justices would have "translated"
the values underlying liberty of occupation and contract in light
127. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 89, at 11-64 (tracing the rise of general incorpo-
ration statutes).
128. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-
1877, at 29 (1988).
129. See ARTHUR S. MILLER, THE SUPREiM COURT AND AMERICAN CAPITALISM 56-
57 (1968) ("[The rise of the collective power of capital, of business enterprise, [was]
all done in the name of an individualism that ... had vanished.")
130. See id. at 57-61; TRIBE, supra note 3, at 574 ("[Als social and economic pat-
terns change or as existing patterns are reassessed, other groups-ultimately, indus-
trial laborers in general-may become unable, or may come to be regarded as un-
able, to protect their own interests effectively."); Forbath, supra note 77, at 795-98;
Pound, supra note 24, at 454 (criticizing protection for liberty of contract in light of
unequal bargaining power produced by modem industrial conditions); Margaret
Spahr, Natural Law, Due Process, and Economic Pressure, 24 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
332, 343-45 (1930) (same).
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of these new circumstances.8 1 Such translation would have
required deferral to legislative judgments, such as maximum
hour laws, minimum wages, and bans on so-called "yellow dog"
contracts-regulations that purportedly enhanced the liberty of
employees.
3 2
As a theoretical proposition, this critique of Lochner and its
progeny shows some promise. After all, true fidelity to the origi-
nal meaning of the Constitution does not always require a judge
to apply the document so as to produce the results that the
Framers would have contemplated at the time of ratification.' 3
To the contrary, some of the most dedicated proponents of an
original meaning approach to constitutional interpretation argue
that judges must, when necessary, "translate" the document's
values in light of new circumstances, a process that may result
in applications of a constitutional provision different from what
the Framers might have anticipated." Indeed, even the "abso-
131. As shown below, Justice Souter explicitly embraced a translation methodology
in Casey. See infra notes 194-99 and accompanying text.
132. See GILLMAN, supra note 24, at 152-75 (criticizing Lochner and its progeny
for refusing to recognize "inequality of bargaining power" between employers and em-
ployees brought about by twentieth-century capitalism); ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE
SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 68-69 (1955); MILLER, supra note 129, at
84-86 (arguing that principles animating Due Process Clause favor use of state pow-
er to enhance individual liberty against private power); SEIDMAN & TUSHNET, supra
note 6, at 113-14, 149-50, 180 (equating Lochner with Dred Scott and arguing that
Lochner rested upon false assumptions about the freedom of employees); SUNSTEN,
supra note 6, at 48-49 ("The same principle that doomed slavery could also call for
government assistance against the forms of coercion that drive people to take menial
jobs at trivial pay, or that force people to work sixty hours per week if they are to
work at all."); Pound, supra note 24, at 467-68 ("[The Framers of the Constitution]
laid down principles, not rules, and rules can only be illustrations of those principles
so long as facts and opinions remain what they were when rules were announced.");
John P. Roche, Entrepreneurial Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 4 LAB. HIST.
3, 11-16 (1963) (arguing that yellow dog contracts were the product of "unequal
bargaining power" and thus beyond protection of liberty of contract). See generally
Lessig, supra note 24 (articulating and defending the theory of interpretive
translation). Of course, lawyers are not alone in advancing this type of justification
for the increased regulation associated with the welfare state. See SIDNEY FINE,
LAISSEZ FAIRE AND THE GENERAL-WELFARE STATE 25 (1966) ("[1In 1865, though
Americans saw a new industrial society emerging, they were without an adequate
philosophy of state action to cope with the problems of that society. What was need-
ed was a new philosophy of the state .... Industrial America made necessary the
evolution of the general-welfare state.").
133. See Lessig, supra note 24, passim.
134. See, e.g., County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 62 n.1 (1991)
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lutist" Justices of the Lochner Era apparently shared this view.
As Justice Sutherland put it in Adkins, "the line beyond which
the power of interference [with liberty of contract] may not be
pressed... may be made to move, within limits not well de-
fined, with changing needs and circumstances."135
Accepting for the sake of argument the legitimacy of a trans-
lation-based approach to constitutional interpretation, there are
nevertheless two obstacles to a repudiation of Lochner that is
premised upon unequal bargaining power. First, any translation
based upon the purported presence of unequal bargaining power
depends upon a controversial normative account of the scope of
the original guarantee. Such a translation assumes that, as un-
derstood in 1868, the police power included the authority to
redress imbalances in bargaining power and thus concern itself
with the purely distributive effects of private transactions. This
account of the police power, however, seems inconsistent with
the account offered by Thomas Cooley and Justice Bradley, who
described a power to combat market failure without regard to
distributional consequences.'36 The Lochner Court, of course, em-
braced this vision, a vision that did not include the authority to
alter the terms of wage bargains between employers and em-
ployees. 1' Indeed, according to the Lochner Justices, inequality
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 995-96 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en
banc) (Bork, J., concurring); Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the
Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1490 (1987) (book review).
135. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 561 (1923) (emphasis added); see
also WiLLIAM H. TAFT, THE ANTI-TRuST ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT 47-48 (1914)
(arguing that "changes of social and business conditions" should cause the Supreme
Court to "qualify" liberty and property rights when applying the Sherman Act); Alan
J. Meese, Liberty and Antitrust in the Formative Era, 79 B.U. L. REV. 1 passim
(1999) (arguing that the Supreme Court sustained the Sherman Act and state anti-
trust statutes against liberty of contract challenges by translating the Due Process
Clause in light of a changed appreciation of the effect of cartel arrangements); Ste-
phen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional Tradi-
tion, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1, 86-89 (1991) (arguing that Lochner-Era Justices believed it
appropriate to apply constitutional principles in light of new circumstances).
136. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text; see also HOVENKAMP, supra
note 89, at 201 (arguing that Thomas Cooley and the nineteenth-century Court de-
fined the police power as consisting of the power to combat "negative externalities
for which the bargaining parties would not account").
137. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905) (concluding that a mere
"labor law" was not within the police power); HOVENKAMP, supra note 89, at 201
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in economic position was an incident of the very existence of
private property and liberty of contract. 38' Laws that abridged
freedom of contract to redress such inequalities struck at the
heart of the constitutional guarantee, and could not be justified
as exercises of the police power." 9 Thus, even if changed eco-
nomic circumstances suggest that unequal bargaining power is
more widespread than it once was, there is no basis for de-
parting from Lochner's application of the Due Process Clause.'
Consequently, any equation of Dred Scott and Lochner would
seem to involve a repudiation of Lochner's principle, and not its
application. 41
Still, the careful reader may not find the above critique of this
translation entirely satisfying. After all, Thomas Cooley and the
theory of externalities notwithstanding, the Court occasionally
sustained regulation that abridged liberty of contract as within
("[The externality-based vision of the police power] explains why the court generally
refused to tolerate inequality of bargaining power as a [rationale for abridging con-
tractual liberty]. Inequality of bargaining power between capitalists and laborers af-
fected the distribution of wealth between the bargaining parties, but the court saw
no effect on anyone else.").
138. For example, in Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915), the Court noted:
Indeed a little reflection will show that wherever the right of private
property and the right of free contract co-exist, each party when
contracting is inevitably more or less influenced by the question
whether he has much property, or little, or none; for the contract is
made to the very end that each may gain something that he needs
or desires more urgently than that which he proposes to give in ex-
change. And, since it is self-evident that, unless all things are held
in common, some persons must have more property than others, it is
from the nature of things impossible to uphold freedom of contract
and the right of private property without at the same time recogniz-
ing as legitimate those inequalities of fortune that are the necessary
result of the exercise of those rights.
Id. at 17.
139. See id. at 18 (MTe police power is broad, and not easily defined, but it can-
not be given the wide scope that is here asserted for it, without in effect nullifying
the constitutional guaranty.").
140. Cf Michael J. Kiarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 402 (1997) (con-
tending that courts that treat all changed circumstances as relevant variables will
inevitably place themselves in the position of altering the relevant constitutional
principle).
141. Cf Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992) (arguing that a
departure from precedent must be justified by something more than mere disagree-
ment with it).
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the police power in order to achieve distributional objectives.
More precisely, the Court regularly enforced, against vigorous
due process challenges, price regulation and antitrust regulation
designed to assure that consumers would receive the prices
produced by a competitive market. In Munn v. Illinois,1' 2 for
instance, the Court-in an opinion joined by Justice
Bradley-sustained the regulation of prices charged by grain
elevators, treating prices above the competitive level as a "harm"
redressable under the police power.1" Later in the century, both
the Supreme Court and numerous state courts upheld the prohi-
bition of horizontal price fixing contracts, concluding that such
antitrust statutes were justified as attempts to assure consum-
ers competitive prices.1" Indeed, some courts explicitly noted
that such statutes were designed to ensure that buyers and
sellers bargained on terms of relative equality.1 45 If the state
could act to redress inequality of bargaining power between
producers and consumers, surely it could act to redress inequali-
ty of bargaining power between employers and employees.' 4 The
142. 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
143. See id. at 124-26, 132; accord Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517 (1892). Com-
pare Charles Fairman, The So-called Granger Cases, Lord Hale, and Justice Bradley,
5 STAN. L. REV. 587, 651-59 (1953) (describing Justice Bradley's influence on majori-
ty opinion in Munn), with COOLEY, supra note 81, at 742-46 (criticizing Munn).
144. See, e.g., Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 199 U.S. 401, 411-12 (1905) (sustain-
ing state antitrust statute against due process challenge); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.
v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 246 (1899) (upholding antitrust statute); State ex rel.
Crow v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 52 S.W. 595, 607-09 (Mo. 1899) (upholding anti-
trust legislation). See generally CUSHMAN, supra note 18, at 89-91; Meese, supra note
135, at 68-80 (discussing federal and state decisions).
145. See, e.g., Firemen's Fund Ins., 52 S.W. at 608 (sustaining antitrust statutes
against due process challenges). As Justice Harlan stated:
If, in the judgment of the State, the people who desire insurance
upon their property are put at a disadvantage when confronted by a
combination or agreement among insurance companies, I do not per-
ceive any sound reason why, preserving the individual right of con-
tracting, it may not forbid such combinations and agreements, and
thereby enable the insured and insurer to meet on terms of equality.
Greenwich Ins. Co., 199 U.S. at 414 (Harlan, J., concurring).
146. See Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 632-33 (1936)
(Stone, J., dissenting) (equating minimum wage regulation with the regulation of
prices in decisions such as Munn); Hand, supra note 2, at 506 (analogizing the regu-
lation of hours of employment to the price regulation sustained in Munn and Budd);
Thomas Reed Powell, The Supreme Court and State Police Power, 1922-1930 (pt. 7),
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realization that employers and employees did not bargain on
terms of relative equality, it seems, should have justified a new
application of the Due Process Clause and the concomitant ex-
pansion of the scope of the police power.'47
One may concede for the sake of argument that legislation
designed to counteract unequal bargaining power in the employ-
ment relationship is consistent with liberty of contract, for the
same reason that, for instance, antitrust regulation survived due
process challenges.Y' Still, this argument for abandoning Lochner
and Adkins fails for lack of factual proof. For, whatever else
might be said of those decisions, they did not involve unequal
bargaining power of the sort that justified antitrust regulation
or regulation of businesses such as the grain elevators in Munn
"affected with a public interest."'49 Indeed, Lochner itself is a
18 VA. L. REV. 379, 400 (1932) (noting that "[rlegulation of methods of competition
are aimed to prevent the powerful from using their power to secure bargains
deemed undesirable" and criticizing courts for voiding attempts to redress unequal
bargaining power in the employment context)..
147.
[Changed economic conditions] made it more likely that judges could
see the differentials in bargaining power in the employment con-
texb-the disparity in market power between the providers of em-
ployment opportunity and the consumers of such opportunity-in the
same way they had always viewed such exaggerated differentials
between producers and consumers of certain other "indispensable"
goods and services.
CUSHMAN, supra note 18, at 91; see GILLMAN, supra note 24, at 136-37, 148, 152-53,
176-77, 203; RUDOLPH PERrrZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA, 1888-1992, at 46-47
(1996) (criticizing Lochner for refusing to recognize purported bargaining disparities
between employees and employers); Samuel R. Olken, Justice George Sutherland and
Economic Liberty: Constitutional Conservatism and the Problem of Factions, 6 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 85-86 (1997) (discussing "serious flaws in [Justice Sutherland's]
jurisprudence of economic liberty" including its failure to recognize "tremendous
changes in industrial society after the Civil War," which brought about "considerable
discrepancy between those few who enjoyed significant economic power and the vast
mqjority" as well as "inequities in the bargaining process"); see also Coppage v. Kan-
sas, 236 U.S. 1, 38 (1915) (Day, J., dissenting) (arguing that yellow dog contracts
were "coercive," and the result of unequal bargaining power).
148. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
149. Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 540
(1923) (absent monopoly, private business is not "affected with a public interest" so
as to justify wage or price regulation). Even Justice Stone agreed with this descrip-
tion of the limits of the police power. See Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418,
451-52 (1927) (Stone, J., dissenting).
An examination of the decisions of this Court in which price regula-
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decision often criticized for its failure to recognize the presence
of unequal bargaining power. 50 However, Professor Siegan has
found that in 1905 there were over three thousand bakeries in
New York State.151 Nearly all of these firms were individual con-
cerns that employed production processes unchanged since the
colonial era.'52 These sole proprietorships, which accounted for
over sixty percent of the industry's output, employed an aver-
aged of 3.76 workers per firm.' There is no indication that
these three thousand bakeries were colluding so as to eliminate
competition over wages and other terms of employment, and
such collusion would find no shelter in liberty of contract. 154 Far
from envincing any unequal bargaining power, these circum-
stances suggest a textbook example of perfect competition.'55
Unlike the nine colluding grain elevators in Munn, or cartelists
who fell prey to antitrust statutes, no bakery in New York State
possessed market power in 1905.156 Not only would bakeries
have to compete against each other for employees; they would
also have to compete against firms in other industries where
bakers might work.' In a market such as this, no individual
tion has been upheld will disclose that the element common to all is
the existence of a situation or a combination of circumstances mate-
rially restricting the regulative force of competition, so that buyers
or sellers are placed at such a disadvantage in the bargaining strug-
gle that serious economic consequences result to a very large number
of members of the community.
Id.
150. See, e.g., PERITZ, supra note 147, at 46-47; SEIDMAN & TUSHNET, supra note
6, at 113-14, 149-50, 180; Hand, supra note 2, at 506-07; Olken, supra note 147, at
29-30.
151. See SIEGAN, supra note 4, at 116.
152. See id. (relying on census data for the conclusion that, of the 3164 bakeries
then operating in New York, 2870 were owned by individuals).
153. See id.
154. See Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 199 U.S. 401, 412 (1905) (holding that
state could outlaw horizontal price fixing agreements "to keep up competition").
155. See generally GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 176-90 (1966) (de-
fining competitive market).
156. Cf Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 131 (1877) (relying upon fact that elevators
set rates collectively to support finding that price regulation was within the police
power); Meese, supra note 135, at 88.
157. See Western & Atlantic R.R. v. Bishop, 50 Ga. 465, 472 (1873) (refusing to
void liability waiver as product of unequal bargaining power because the railroad
company had no monopoly in the labor market. It was "only one of a million of
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firm would have any power over wages or other terms of employ-
ment; instead, any firm that attempted to depress wages below
the competitive level or impose other non-competitive terms
would find itself unable to hire anyone.' Similarly, it is difficult
to believe that the hotels employing elevator operators, or the
hospitals employing scrubwomen, possessed the power to set
non-competitive terms in the larger labor' market at issue in
Adkins.'59 The yeoman farmers and hardy proprietors of 1868, to
whom Justice Bradley and Thomas Cooley would have granted
liberty of occupation and contract, worked very hard and sold
the fruit of their labor into a competitive market.' 6 The employ-
ees of New York's three thousand bakeries,' 6 ' and the elevator
operators and washerwomen of Washington, D.C. did the
same.
16 2
To be sure, inequalities of wealth characterized the employ-
ment relationships at issue in Lochner and Adkins. The small
baker in Lochner and the hospital in Adkins certainly owned
more property than most, if not all, of their employees.' Many
employers with whom . .. the plaintiff might have sought employment."), quoted in
CUSHMAN, supra note 18, at 116.
158. See DON BELLANTE & MARK JACKSON, LABOR ECONOMICS-CHOICE IN LABOR
MARKETS 31-47 (1979); ALLAN M. CARTI'ER & F. RAY MARSHALL, LABOR ECONOMICS
215-16 (1972).
159. See Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 542 (1923) (noting that one of
the plaintiffs, "a woman [ofl twenty-one years of age, was employed by the Congress
Hall Hotel Company as an elevator operator"); Brief for Appellees at 5, Adkins (Nos.
795 and 796), reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 5 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975)
[hereinafter LANDMARK BRIEFS] (noting that one plaintiff, a hospital employed
"scrubwomen, washerwomen, attendants, etc.").
160. See Glickstein, supra note 118, passim (noting that abolitionists equated "fib-
erty" with the right to sell one's labor in a competitive market); supra notes 117-18
and accompanying text.
161. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see also SIEGAN, supra note 4,
at 116 (indicating that there were 3164 bakery establishments in New York State in
1905).
162. See Adkins, 261 U.S. at 542.
163. But see PAUL KENS, LOCHNER V. NEW YORK 7 (1998).
[Bakery owners were typically] former journeymen workers who had
broken away from their employers to form their own small bakeries.
By taking that step, however, they were not transformed into cap-
tains of industry, nor did they even reach the status of a successful
shopkeeper. At least in major urban areas, their lives more closely
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view this disparity as a source of unequal bargaining power
justifying abridgement of contractual liberty. 64 Still, there is no
logical relationship between an employer's wealth and its bar-
gaining power. Instead, bargaining power, defined as the ability
to demand and obtain terms that depart from the competitive
norm, is a function of market concentration and the presence or
absence of collusion.165 A market with one hundred participants,
each with a small share of the industry's sales, will produce
competitive wages and prices even if each participant is a mil-
lionaire. 166 Indeed, to the extent that the unequal distribution of
property on which some scholars rely was associated with the
resembled those of jobbers in the tenement garment industry than
those of shopkeepers or entrepreneurs.
Id.
164. See GILLMAN, supra note 24, at 159-60 (arguing that the Lochner Court im-
properly rejected the argument that "the maturation of capitalist forms of production
had resulted in more coercive market relations and less freedom for vulnerable
groups"); MILLER, supra note 129, at 57-60 (asserting that unequal bargaining power
characterized the employment relationships addressed by the Lochner Court because
individual employees bargained with "a collectivity, a corporation" and that the
Court "failed to see that freedom could be limited by centers of economic power-the
corporation-as well as by government"); see also PERITZ, supra note 147, at 46
(claiming that bakeries in Lochner had superior bargaining power because they were
"corporate or otherwise aggregated employers" who "as a class [were] propertied and
relatively scarce"); Ernst, supra note 123, at 261-63, 266 (quoting former U.S. Attor-
ney General Richard Olney to the effect that 'the individual worker could no longer
be expected to pit 'his single, feeble strength against the might of organized capi-
tal").
165. See generally STIGLER, supra note 155, at 29-63.
166. Judge Easterbrook recently made a similar point in the antitrust context,
holding that a firm's market power is unrelated to its sales:
A dollar yardstick never measured market power ... Proof that GE
sells $5 million, or $5 billion, worth of industrial lighting products
every year is irrelevant to the market power issue. To show market
power, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant's sales loom so
large in relation to rivals' sales and production capacity that a re-
duction in output by the defendant could not quickly be made up by
other firms' increased output.
L.P.D., Inc. v. General Elec. Corp., 132 F.3d 402, 405 (7th Cir. 1997); see also
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADECOMMISSION, HORIZON-
TAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 1.5 (1992), reprinted in PHILLIP A. PROPER & BRIAN R.
HENRY, ANTITRUST ASPECTS OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS, 56-2nd C.P.S. (BNA),
Worksheet 2 (treating market with ten firms, each of equal size, as "unconcentrated"
and likely to produce competitive prices). It should be noted that these guidelines do
not take into account the wealth of the firms in question.
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"aggregation of capital" and maturing "capitalist forms of pro-
duction,"'67 this inequality increased the productivity of labor
and enhanced working conditions. Real wages also rose, thus
fortifying the case for protection of liberty of contract.'68 This, of
course, was exactly the trend that wages followed between 1868
and 1930.169 Thus, although economic circumstances, namely,
the scale of industrial operations, changed between 1868 and
1937, they did not change in a manner that undermined Lochner
or Adkins.7 °
Now, of course, there may be some labor markets in which
employers do have sufficient market power to foist non-competi-
tive terms on their employees.17' Moreover, there may have been
more such markets in 1905 than there were in 1868.172 If so,
then perhaps the Lochner Court was too aggressive in protecting
contractual liberty in some cases. Still, the presence of bargain-
ing power in some instances does not justify the equation of
Lochner with Dred Scott and the concomitant failure to protect
liberty of contract in all cases. Any attempt to repudiate contrac-
tual liberty wholesale through this "translation" must fail.'73
167. GILLMAN, supra note 24, at 159 (arguing that "maturation of capitalist forms
of production" conferred additional bargaining power on employers); see also PERITZ,
supra note 147, at 46.
168. See SIEGAN, supra note 4, at 124-25 (reporting increase in wages and reduc-
tion in working hours during this period); see also Kiarman, supra note 140, at 406
(noting that changed circumstances can often suggest more than one translation).
169. See CUSHMAN, supra note 18, at 116-17; SIEGAN, supra note 4, at 125 (re-
porting that real wages tripled between 1840 and 1915). Indeed, in Adkins, the
Court expressly took note of the rise in real wages as evidence that minimum wage
laws were not necessary to enhance the lot of workers. See Adkins v. Children's
Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 560 (1923) ("We cannot close our eyes to the notorious fact
that earnings everywhere in all occupations have greatly increased-not alone in
States where the minimum wage law obtains but in the country generally.").
170. See Klarman, supra note 140, at 402-03.
171. See CARTrER & MARSHALL, supra note 158, at 219-21 (describing how firms
with power in the labor market can impose non-competitive terms on workers).
172. On the other hand, it seems possible that increased mobility of labor may
have broadened the scope of labor markets and thus reduced the number of firms
that possessed significant bargaining power over their employees.
173. Indeed, to the extent that the Lochner Court did sustain abridgements of lib-
erty of contract in some instances where employers possessed bargaining power, such
a translation would work only marginal changes in the decisional law of that era.
See, e.g., Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389-90 (1898) (sustaining maximum hour
legislation for miners based in part on the presence of unequal bargaining power).
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There is, perhaps, one last arrow in the quiver of Justice
Souter and others, that is, one last sense in which Lochner may
be deemed the "echo" of Dred Scott. Industrial conditions were
not the only thing that changed between 1868 and 1905; the
notion of law changed as well. Although those who wrote and
ratified the Fourteenth Amendment viewed the common law,
and the distribution of resources that it protected, as natural,
pre-political, and inevitable, legal theorists in the early twenti-
eth century "recognized" that these rules and entitlements were
the product of state choices."7 Some scholars have argued that
these choices largely determined the outcome of the bargain
between employers and employees."75 By defining liberty against
this background, one could argue, the Court imposed a contro-
versial policy choice under the guise of constitutional
interpretation. 6 Once it became clear that the "liberty" con-
structed by the common law was simply a product of positive
law, the Court could no longer maintain that common law liber-
ty had a privileged status vis-d-vis other conceptions of liber-
ty-such as the liberty of employees to work for a living
wage-that legislatures may construct by statute.
177
But see HOVENKAMP, supra note 89, at 201-02 (asserting that, during the Lochner
Era, unequal bargaining power could not, by itself, justify interference with liberty of
contract).
174. See SEIDMAN & TUSHNET, supra note 6, at 149-50 ("Lochner's critics pointed
out that bakers 'chose' to enter such contracts while caught in a social and economic
setting that dictated a particular outcome. Government intervention was justified to
control private forces that coerced workers and other vulnerable groups to act in cer-
tain ways."); SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 50; Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sover-
eignty, 13 CoRNELL L.Q. 8 (1927); Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a
Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCL Q. 470 (1923); see also Southern Pac.
Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The common law
is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of some sover-
eign . . ").
175. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 51-53 (suggesting that bargaining power
would not exist without government protection); cf Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathe-
dral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1098-99 (1972) (noting that the initial allocation of a
right or entitlement can affect the distribution of income).
176. See SEIDMAN & TUSHNET, supra note 6, at 149-50; SUNSTEIN, supra note 6,
at 51-53.
177. See GILLMAN, supra note 24, at 156-57; SEIDMAN & TUSHNET, supra note 6,
at 149-50; SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 50-51; Lessig, supra note 18, at 451-53.
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Unlike the fact-based translation described above, this argu-
ment suffers from a threshold theoretical weakness. The Consti-
tution must assume some baseline distribution of rights and
entitlements, independent from those determined by the legisla-
ture. 7 ' Were it otherwise, many of its protections would make
no sense. For instance, the Takings Clause by its very nature
implicitly assumes a common law baseline; otherwise, the legis-
lature could avoid its requirements simply by redefining the
baseline in its favor. 7 ' Similarly, the Constitution's explicit
protection against retroactive abridgement of contracts, the Con-
tracts Clause, can only make sense if the legislature cannot
redefine the relevant baseline to render all contracts subject to
retroactive abridgement.8
Undoubtedly, these baselines rest upon policy choices, as do
the constitutional provisions they help construct. Without more,
however, this realization-if it really is one-does not render
economic liberties nugatory.' 81 Instead, the contractual liberty
championed by Thomas Cooley, Justice Bradley, and others
ought to be defined against the baseline extant when the Four-
teenth Amendment was ratified. Absent a showing that this
baseline guaranteed certain minimum working conditions,
Lochner and its progeny should survive.1 2
178. Even Professor Sunstein, the most enthusiastic proponent of this critique of
Lochner, concedes this point. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 873, 903 (1987) ("Without some foundations or baselines from which to make
measurements, legal analysis cannot go forward, and in some cases it is hard to dis-
pute that understandings like those reflected in the common law or the status quo
are the appropriate baseline.").
179. See id. at 891 ("It would be difficult, however, to abandon [common law]
baselines altogether without reading the contracts and takings clauses out of the
Constitution."); cf Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1026-32
(1992) (holding that a state may not redefine the common law definition of nuisance
without providing compensation); PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74,
93-94 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring) (suggesting that the Due Process Clause
would itself forbid certain attempts to redefine or abolish property rights).
180. Indeed, Professor Sunstein concedes that the Contracts Clause depends upon
a common law baseline. See Sunstein, supra note 178, at 890-91. He does not ex-
plain why the contractual liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment should
rest on a different footing.
181. Thomas Cooley, for instance, apparently recognized that positive law con-
structed liberty of contract long before the New Deal. See Thomas Cooley, Limits to
State Control of Private Business, 1 PRINCETON REV. 233, 238 (Mar. 1878).
182. I do not mean to suggest that such a showing would be impossible. Perhaps
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Even if such a showing could be made, however, there would
be no justification for abandoning liberty of contract altogether.
Not all abridgements of contractual liberty are designed to strike
a blow against the status quo by reconstructing an unjust base-
line distribution of wealth. Here again, the facts of Lochner are
instructive. Like many labor laws, the law in Lochner apparent-
ly was designed to protect the corporate bakeries of the status
quo against competitive pressure from sole proprietorships,
many of them owned by recent immigrants."8 These larger cor-
porate bakeries employed capital-intensive production processes
that allowed them to bake bread without employing workers for
more than ten hours per day.' Proprietorships, by contrast, re-
lied on technology that required more labor per unit of output
and involved at least twelve-hour shifts for efficient operation. 8
By foisting ten-hour workdays on their competitors, the larger
firms could raise the costs of these smaller rivals, putting many
of them out of business and throwing their employees out of
work.'86 Were such a result achieved by private contract, it
one could demonstrate that those who wrote and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment
assumed that mere' enforcement of the common law baseline and the resulting opera-
tion of markets would result in a distribution of resources that assured a living
wage for those who worked. However, neither Justice Souter nor any other propo-
nent of this translation has made such a showing.
183. See SIEGAN, supra note 4, at 117; Richard A. Epstein, The Mistakes of 1937,
11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 5, 17 (1988).
184. See SIEGAN, supra note 4, at 116-18; see also KENS, supra note 163, at 7-8
(reporting that, in 1899, only ten percent of the bakeries in New York used power
machinery such as mechanical mixers and molders).
185. See SIEGAN, supra note 4, at 116-17.
186. See Epstein, supra note 183, at 17; see also SIEGAN, supra note 4, at 117-18.
According to Professor Siegan, the president of one small bakers' association criti-
cized the law at issue in Lochner on these grounds: -'It is impossible for the small
bakeries to comply with all the laws. The laws are all in favor of the large bakeries
and the aim seems to be to drive the small bakeries out of business.'" SIEGAN, supra
note 4, at 117. This was, by no means an isolated case; scholars have identified oth-
er instances in which maximum hour legislation was employed to disadvantage la-
bor-intensive firms, often to the detriment of unpopular minorities. For instance, in
In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98 (1885), the New York Court of Appeals voided New York's
ban on the manufacture of cigars in tenement houses. See id. at 113-15. Passed at
the behest of the cigarmaker's union, the ban sought to eliminate competition that
unionized, capital-intensive firms faced from smaller non-union shops. See Forbath,
supra note 77, at 795-96; Roche, supra note 132, at 23-25; see also David Bernstein,
Lochner, Parity, and the Chinese Laundry Cases, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 231-
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would violate the antitrust lMws. 8  It can hardly be said that
such a statute alters the status quo in favor of the less powerful
or enhances the "liberty" of employees.
Of course, maximum hour laws are not the only purportedly
redistributionist abridgements of liberty of contract that can
backfire. 8 Basic price theory predicts that an increase in the
minimum wage, for instance, will reduce employment among
unskilled workers.8 9 Moreover, by making capital-intensive
production processes relatively less expensive, such laws en-
hance the demand for skilled workers, who labor well above the
minimum rate. 9 As a result, far from redistributing wealth and
44 (1999) (recounting use of maximum hour laws to disadvantage labor-intensive
Chinese laundries in 1880s); Elisabeth M. Landes, The Effect of State Maximum-
Hours Laws on the Employment of Women in 1920, 88 J. POL. ECON. 476, 476
(1980) (concluding that state laws limiting the hours worked by women reduced
employment opportunities for immigrant women by up to thirty percent in some
states). Indeed, the campaign to enact the limitations at issue in Lochner was led by
an anti-Chinese agitator, whom California had once imprisoned for possession of ex-
plosives. See KENS, supra note 163, at 53-66.
187. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 668 (1965) (declaring
a conspiracy by unions and large coal mines to impose higher wages on small opera-
tions per se unlawful); Robert H. Lande & Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr., Anticonsumer Ef-
fects of Union Mergers: An Antitrust Solution, 46 DUKE L.J. 197, 220-24 (1996) (de-
scribing various conspiracies by unions and employers to raise rivals' costs); Oliver
Williamson, Wage Rates as a Barrier to Entry: The Pennington Case In Perspective,
82 Q.J. ECON. 85 (1968). See generally Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Stephen C.
Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price,
96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986).
188. See generally David E. Bernstein, Roots of the 'Underclass: The Decline of
Laissez-Faire Jurisprudence and the Rise of Racist Labor Legislation, 43 A1i. U. L.
REV. 85 (1993) (describing how various forms of New Deal labor regulation promoted
white labor unions at the expense of non-unionized blacks).
189. See Adlkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 560 (1923) ("[1In periods of de-
pression and struggle for employment.., the efficient will be employed at the nin-
imum rate, while the less capable may not be employed at all."); WILLI" J.
BAUIOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 544 (1998); Ep-
stein, supra note 183, at 19-20 (arguing that "the 'protection' of all low-paid workers
[via a minimum wage] may benefit other higher paid workers, often union workers,
in competition with firms that use cheaper labor. Or the minimum wage laws may
benefit rival firms that have heavier dependence on capital").
190. See Williamson, supra note 187, at 113-15. Similarly, one historian reports
that so-called "yellow dog" contracts were most often adopted by smaller proprietor-
ships who faced stiff competition from larger, often unionized corporate concerns. See
Ernst, supra note 123, at 251-52, 256. To the extent that the firms employed labor-
intensive production processes, they suffered disproportionately at the hands of col-
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opportunities toward the less fortunate, such laws will some-
times benefit the status quo, that is, the skilled workers who
have greater access to the political process than those who are
less skilled and more vulnerable.' 9'
This is not to say that all labor legislation necessarily harms
those whom it purports to protect. Some labor legislation en-
hances the welfare of the less fortunate, and the Lochner Court
was receptive to statutes that actually improved health and
safety.192 Still, the fact that some such legislation may advance
the general welfare cannot justify the wholesale repudiation of
economic liberty, any more than the efficacy of some restrictions
on speech can justify the complete evisceration of the First
Amendment. If, in fact, those who adopted the Fourteenth
Amendment agreed with Thomas Cooley and Justice Bradley
that "liberty" includes the right to sell one's labor, and if legisla-
tures may abridge that liberty for purely redistributive purposes,
it seems incumbent upon Justice Souter and others who would
invoke substantive due process to develop doctrinal tools for
distinguishing truly redistributive abridgements from those that
simply serve the status quo.
IV. CASEY, THE DEPRESSION, AND MINIMAL LEVELS OF HUMAN
WELFARE
Even before analogizing Lochner to Dred Scott, Justice Souter
suggested a different explanation for his unwillingness to protect
economic liberties against arbitrary abridgement, an explanation
lective bargaining arrangements that raised the price of labor. See id. at 257-58.
191. See CHARLES F. ROOS, NRA EcONOMIC PLANNING 173 (1937) (asserting that
the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) put one-half million blacks out of
work); Bernstein, supra note 186, at 282 n.524 (describing how minimum wages
placed unskilled minorities at a disadvantage in the labor market, causing many to
lose their jobs); Peter Linneman, The Economic Impacts of Minimum Wage Laws: A
New Look at an Old Question, 90 J. POL. ECON. 443, 462 (1982) (finding that 1974
increases in the federal minimum wage increased the incomes of unionized workers
who already earned well over the minimum wage, while reducing the incomes of un-
skilled workers, particularly women); see also Williamson, supra note 187, at 113-15.
192. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 61-62 (1905) (acknowledging that
health and safety regulation of bakery premises was a proper form of regulation);
Epstein, supra note 183, at 15 ("The comprehensive acceptance of health regulation
in the pre-1937 period was too broad.").
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that also required a form of translation. In Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, 9 3 the Justice coauthored an opinion with Justices Ken-
nedy and O'Connor explaining their collective refusal to overrule
Roe v. Wade.1" In so doing, the three Justices thought it neces-
sary, in a portion of the opinion that Justice Souter read from
the bench, to explain why Roe was immune from the sort of
treatment that the principle of liberty of contract and liberty of
occupation had received at the hands of West Coast Hotel and
Carolene Products.
s5
The opinion was more explicit than the Justice's Glucksberg
concurrence about the rationale for the dichotomy between eco-
nomic and other liberties. In Casey, the Justice suggested a form
of translation, albeit one quite different from that implicit in his
equation of Lochner with Dred Scott.'96 To be precise, Justice
Souter argued that the nation's experience during the Great
Depression established that the sort of liberty of contract pro-
tected by Lochner was inconsistent with the achievement of
"minimal levels of human welfare."'97 Thus, it was not only ap-
propriate but imperative that the Court reverse itself in West
Coast Hotel. s Justice Souter's statement is worth quoting in
full:
The Lochner decisions were exemplified by Adkins v.
Childrens Hospital of District of Columbia, 261 U.S. 525
(1923), in which the Court held it to be an infringement of
constitutionally protected liberty of contract to require the
employers of adult women to satisfy minimum wage stan-
dards. Fourteen years later, West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379 (1937), signaled the demise of Lochner by over-
ruling Adkins. In the meantime, the Depression had come
193. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
194. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
195. See David Savage, High Court Affirms Right to Abortion, L.A. TIMEs, June
30, 1992, at Al (reporting that Justice Souter announced that the portion of the
joint opinion asserting that adherence to Roe was required by stare decisis); see also
TRIBE, supra note 3, at 567 n.2 (noting that, between 1899 and 1937, the Court
voided nearly 200 laws as abridging liberty of occupation or liberty of contract).
196. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 861-62 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter, JJ.).
197. Id. at 862.
198. See id. at 861.
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and, with it, the lesson that seemed unmistakable to most
people by 1937, that the interpretation of contractual freedom
protected in Adkins rested on fundamentally false factual
assumptions about the capacity of a relatively unregulated
market to satisfy minimal levels of human welfare.... [Tihe
clear demonstration that the facts of economic life were dif-
ferent from those previously assumed warranted the repudia-
tion of the old law.99
Like the equation of Lochner with Dred Scott, this translation
suggested by Justice Souter has also been offered by several
scholars.2" Moreover, it is theoretically coherent. No one, after
all, would defend a conception of liberty that led to massive
unemployment or threatened economic collapse.2 °1 Salus Populi
Est Suprema Lex.
Theoretical coherence or not, however, this translation is
simply not supported by the "facts of economic life." °2 Protection
of liberty of contract did not produce the Depression, nor did
abridgement of this freedom counteract it. Like many other
programs associated with the New Deal, the regulation of wages,
199. Id. at 861-62.
200. Indeed, no less an authority than Professor Tribe states:
In large measure, however, it was the economic realities of the De-
pression that graphically undermined Lochner's premises. No longer
could it be argued with great conviction that the invisible hand of
economics was functioning simultaneously to protect individual rights
and produce a social optimum. The legal 'freedom' of contract and
property came increasingly to be seen as an illusion, subject as it
was to impersonal economic forces. Positive government intervention
came to be more widely accepted as essential to economic survival,
and legal doctrines would henceforth have to operate from that
premise.
TRIBE, supra note 3, at 578; see also Lessig, supra note 18, at 460-61; Wayne
McCormack, Property and Liberty-Institutional Competence and the Functions of
Rights, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 10 (1994) ("The protections [for economic rights]
thus developed withered when the Great Depression showed that unregulated indus-
trialization represented risks too great to be borne by a sensible society."); Robert C.
Post, Defending the Lifeworld& Substantive Due Process in the Taft Court Era, 78
B.U. L. REV. 1489, 1545 (1998) (lecture) ("[Wie have since the great depression come
to view economic transactions in the way that Sutherland viewed urban land in Eu-
clid.").
201. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963) ("[W~hile the
Constitution protects against invasions of individual rights, it is not a suicide pact.").
202. Casey, 505 U.S. at 862 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
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hours, and other facets of working conditions began long before
the Great Depression, often in times of full employment, and has
continued long after it.2°s To be sure, in the 1930s, some econo-
mists did believe that aggregate demand, and thus Gross Na-
tional Product (GNP), could be stimulated by regulating wages
and prices so as to restore "purchasing power" among those
consumers-wage workers and small businesses-likely to spend
a high proportion of their income.2 This belief was expressed in
the government-sponsored wage and price fixing of the National
Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA).2°5 Indeed, defending the NIRA
in the Supreme Court, the United States argued that the mini-
mum wage provisions of the statute were necessary to achieve "a
prompt increase in total wage distributions [in order to] provide
a necessary stimulus to start in motion the cumulative forces
making for expanding commercial activity." 6
203. See id. at 960-61 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
204. See ROBERT F. HIMMELBERG, THE ORIGINS OF THE NATIONAL RECOVERY AD-
MINISTRATION 190-92, 197 (1993) (describing these theories); THEODORE ROSENOF,
DOGMA, DEPRESSION, AND THE NEW DEAL 39-43 (1975) (same); HERBERT STEIN, THE
FISCAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICA 48-49 (1969) (same); see also New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 306-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (suggesting that
limitations on entry were necessary to control overproduction). Similarly, Professor
Corwin believed that protection for liberty of contract would hinder the sort of "so-
cial planning" necessary to defeat the Depression. See Edward S. Corwin, Social
Planning Under the Constitution - A Study in Perspectives, 26 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1,
26-27 (1932). Finally, some believed that, by encouraging the formation of unions
and thus the cartelization of labor, the government could raise purchasing power
and enhance aggregate demand. See Ernst, supra note 123, at 270-73.
205. See HIMMELBERG, supra note 204, at 190-92; STEIN, supra note 204, at 48-49;
see also Robert L. Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-
1946, 59 HARV. L. REV. 645, 653 (1946) (asserting that one purpose of the NIRA
was to restore "deflated purchasing power of the masses").
206. Brief for United States at 90-91, A.LJA. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (Nos. 854 and 864), reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, su-
pra note 159; see also CUSHMAN, supra note 18, at 158 (discussing government's reli-
ance upon the purchasing power theory in Schechter). Similarly, the United States
defended the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) of 1933, which taxed
"overproduction" of farm products, by claiming that such de facto cartelization was
necessary to raise farm prices and thus "agricultural purchasing power," thereby
stimulating the demand for farm implements, credit, fuel and the like. See United
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 74-75, 78 (1936) (voiding the AAA); Brief for the Unit-
ed States, United States v. Butler (No. 401), reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra
note 159, at 332-80; ROBERT JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 125-
37 (1941) (arguing that the Court thwarted economic recovery when it voided the
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The NIRA, of course, was declared unconstitutional by a
unanimous Court, and the nation climbed out of the Depression
anyway." 7 Few, if any, modern economists believe that mini-
mum wage laws would have averted the Great Depression, or
that the regulation of working conditions is an effective tool of
macroeconomic stabilization. A higher wage for some translates
into unemployment and/or higher prices for others, and many of
those negatively impacted are even more destitute-and thus
more prone to consume-than the beneficiaries of the legisla-
tion. °8 Whatever the original cause of the downturn, economists
agree it was accelerated by the government's failure to pursue
effective monetary and fiscal policies. °9 Moreover, far from coun-
teracting the Depression, the sort of minimum wage regulations
sustained in West Coast Hotel may well have exacerbated the
situation by clogging the mechanisms of natural economic ad-
justment. As John Maynard Keynes observed in 1935, recessions
occur because wages are "sticky downwards," thus preventing
reductions in costs and prices that would, in turn, increase the
real money supply and enhance aggregate demand.210 Before the
NIRA and other schemes to set minimum wages, prices and
wages were sticky;21' afterwards, they were stuck. Liberty of
AAA).
207. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550-51
(1935) (voiding NIRA on the grounds of excessive delegation); see also Lessig, supra
note 18, at 465 & 466 n.319 (suggesting that the Court saw in the NIRA the seeds
of fascism).
208. See Bernstein, supra note 186, at 282 n.524.
209. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HIS-
TORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1867-1960, at 300-01 (1963) (arguing that the Federal
Reserve's tight monetary policies caused and exacerbated the Depression); David C.
Wheelock, Monetary Policy in the Great Depression and Beyond: The Sources of the
Fed's Inflation Bias, in THE ECONOMICS OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION 129 (Mark
Wheeler ed., 1998) ("By almost any measure, monetary policy during the period
1929-1933 was a disaster: the money supply and price level both fell by one-third.").
210. See GARDNER ACKLEY, MACROECONOMIC THEORY 135 (1961) (arguing that pol-
icies such as minimum wage legislation will "create unemployment" if the wage is
set above the market rate); WENDY CARLIN & DAVID SOSKICE, MACROECONOMICS AND
THE WAGE BARGAIN: A MODERN APPROACH TO EMPLOYMENT, INFLATION, AND THE EX-
CHANGE RATE 49 (1990) ("In Keynes's model .... the failure of money wages to
fall ... led, in the context of a fall in autonomous demand, to the real wage rising
and the consequent fall in employment and output . . . ."); STEIN, supra note 204, at
149 (noting that Keynes thought the NIRA impeded national recovery).
211. According to Keynes, government could counteract depression through mas-
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contract and full employment are not mutually exclusive. It is
ironic that the Depression, prolonged and deepened by the cen-
tral government's failure to discharge its core function of macro-
economic stabilization, has been used to justify an expansion of
state power, power that when exercised actually prolonged eco-
nomic collapse.
Of course, one cannot criticize Justice Souter's account of a
1937 translation based upon (slightly) more modern economic
theories. Perhaps, in the mid-1930s, when some economists
actually believed low wages were responsible for the Depression,
courts should have stepped aside and allowed legislatures to
have their way. 13 On the other hand the Court, under the ban-
sive deficit spending. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EM-
PLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY 128-29 (1935) (arguing that deficit-financed public
works could bring an economy out of depression). Indeed, according to Alvin Hansen,
one of President Roosevelt's chief economic advisors, there was very little overlap be-
tween Keynesian economics and the New Deal. See ALVIN H. HANSEN, THE AMERI-
CAN ECONOMY 159 (1957). As Hansen put it: "It is often said that the New Deal
had little or nothing to do with Keynes's teaching. This is for the most part true."
Id. at 159 n.6. Hansen, of course, shared Keynes's view that what had cured the
Depression was massive deficit spending, and not any abridgement of liberty of occu-
pation or contract. According to many economists, that is exactly what happened.
See RUDIGER DORNBUSCH & STANLEY FISCHER, MACRO-ECONOMICS 423-24 (4 ed.
1987) (describing so-called "Keynesian" explanation for Great Depression and subse-
quent recovery). Others, however, disagree, attributing the defeat of the Depression
to a more enlightened monetary policy. See id. at 546-47 (describing this school of
thought); FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 209, at 493-545. Neither explanation,
of course, has anything to do with minimum wages or other regulations of the em-
ployment relation. Thus, economics textbooks discuss the causes and cures of the
Great Depression without mentioning such abridgements of contractual liberty. See,
e.g., ANTHONY S. CAMPAGNA, MACROECONOMICS 294-95 (1981); DORNBUSCH &
FISCHER, supra, at 422-26; PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY
ANALYSIS 375 (5th ed. 1961) ("Everywhere in the free world governments and central
banks have shown they can win the battle of the slump. They have the weapons of
fiscal policy (expenditure and taxes) and of monetary policy (open-market operations,
discount-rate policy, legal reserve ratio policy) to shift the schedules that determine
national income and employment. Just as we no longer meekly accept disease, we no
longer need accept mass unemployment."); STEIN, supra note 204, at 169-240 (de-
scribing the emergence of a post-World War I consensus that fiscal policy could sta-
bilize the macro-economy).
212. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 50 (1962) ("The Great De-
pression in the United States, far from being a sign of the inherent instability of
the private enterprise system, is a testament to how much harm can be done by
mistakes on the part of [The Federal Reserve] when they wield vast power over the
monetary system of a country.").
213. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 765-68 (1997) (Souter, J., con-
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ner of substantive due process, has second-guessed more compli-
cated legislative judgments. In Roe v. Wade, for instance, the
Justices rejected the determination by the State of Texas that
life begins at conception. 2 4 Determining whether, legislative
wage fixing will stabilize the economy would seem easy by com-
parison.
Let us assume for a moment, however, that the belief that
legislative wage fixing would stabilize the economy justified
West Coast Hotel's repudiation of Lochner and Adkins. Let us
also assume that the state attempted to justify legislative wage
fixing on this ground.21" Even if this were the case, the subse-
quent realization that these perceptions were false would justify,
indeed require, the repudiation of West Coast Hotel and rein-
statement of Lochner and Adkins.216 At the very most, the occur-
rence of the Depression should have led the Court to abandon its
hostility to minimum wage laws only temporarily, until it be-
came clear to all that other tools of economic stabilization were
more effective. Translation, after all, is not a ratchet; it presum-
ably works both ways.1
curring) (arguing that, where the factual basis of claimed liberty is arguable, court
should defer to the legislature). Presumably, of course, proponents of the laws in
question would have to attempt to justify them in this manner. In this regard it
should be noted that neither Washington nor New York attempted to justify their
minimum wage laws as methods of macroeconomic stabilization. See Brief Amicus
Curiae for the State of Washington, passim, West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379 (1937) (No. 293), reprinted in 33 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 159, at
137-61; Brief for the State of New York, passim, Morehead v. New York ex rel.
Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (No. 838).
214. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159-62 (1973) (holding that a legislature can-
not conclude life begins at conception).
215. It did not. See supra note 213 (noting that Washington did not attempt to
justify its minimum wage as a method of macroeconomic stabilization).
216. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861-62 (1992) (concluding
that the Court was bound to overrule Adkins and Lochner in light of changed cir-
cumstances).
217. Indeed, the chief proponent of translation theory, Professor Lessig, concedes
as much in a different context. Specifically, Lessig argues that the adoption of the
exclusionary rule in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), was a faithful translation of
the Fourth Amendment's values in light of the inadequacy of modern remedies for
Fourth Amendment violations. See Lessig, supra note 24, at 1232-33. He also notes,
however, that the Court would have to abandon Mapp if, in fact, a legislature creat-
ed a suitable remedy other than exclusion. See id.
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In response, Justice Souter and others might point out that
the presence of full employment does not, ipso facto, guarantee
minimum levels of human welfare. Absent a minimum wage, for
instance, some workers may not earn enough to provide for their
own basic subsistence. The Depression, it might be said, demon-
strated that some regulation of the employment relationship
may be necessary to prevent our fellow citizens from starving.
Lochner and its progeny may indeed be inconsistent with main-
taining minimum levels of human welfare.
This argument for repudiation of Lochner is unpersuasive on
several grounds. Certainly Justice Bradley, Thomas Cooley, and
the Lochner Justices would not have been surprised to learn
that an unregulated market left some people behind. The real
wage was lower in 1870 than it would be in the Lochner Era.218
Nothing about the "facts of economic life," then, had changed in
a way that suggested a repudiation of liberty of contract. To be
sure, rising real wages left some people behind, people that can
only be helped by state action. Yet, full and vigorous enforce-
ment of liberty of contract still leaves the state perfectly free to
assure minimal levels of human welfare through taxing and
spending.219 Thus, while a state operating under the injunction
of Adkins could not impose a minimum wage, it could, for in-
stance, adopt an earned income tax credit, or make cash pay-
ments directly to the poor. In light of these alternatives, it is
difficult to assert that the protection of liberty of contract pre-
vents a more just distribution of resources and is therefore in-
consistent with "minimal levels of human welfare."
220
Of course, one could respond that the choice between taxing
and spending, and promulgating a minimum wage law should be
left to the legislature.2 1 When the state abridges fundamental
liberties, however, it must, at a minimum, demonstrate that the
218. See CUSHMAN, supra note 18, at 116 (reporting that real wages grew 37%
between 1890-1914).
219. See Sunstein, supra note 178, at 878 n.27 (noting that Lochner evinced a
"preference for redistribution through taxation rather than regulation").
220. Casey, 505 U.S. at 862 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ).
221. Cf. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 765-68 (1997) (Souter, J., con-
curring) (arguing that Court should not, under the guise of substantive due process
review, prefer one reasonable legislative choice to another).
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abridgement is the least restrictive means of achieving the objec-
tive in question.222 Because the alternative of direct payments
from the public fisc can achieve the same objectives without
interfering with a protected liberty, a decision by the legislature
to abridge liberty of contract would seem to be unreasonable.2
This result follows naturally from the scope of the police pow-
er envisioned by Thomas Cooley, Justice Bradley, and other
contemporaries of the Fourteenth Amendment. According to
these jurists, a law that offended liberty simply to transfer re-
sources from one class to another did not fall within the police
power and consequently was void.2 ' This was simply an applica-
tion of the more general assumption that the state could not
take property from A and give it to B.225 The occurrence of the
Great Depression did not call for a different application of this
principle.
Ironically, however, the availability of such a less restrictive
alternative has, for some, provided the most convincing rationale
for rejecting Lochner's protection for liberty of contract. Once the
state has in place programs that are designed to aid the poor, an
employer's failure to pay a sufficiently high wage can be viewed
as casting upon the state the burden of an employee's subsis-
tence.2 6 To the extent that this burden can be characterized as
an externality, this "realization" suggests that interference with
contractual liberty can, in fact, be within the police power.2 7
This reasoning formed at least part of the rationale of West
222. See Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989) (voiding
ban on telephone pornography in light of less restrictive, albeit slightly less effective,
alternatives).
223. See Daniel Shaviro, The Minimum Wage, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and
Optimal Subsidy Policy, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 405, 474 (1997) ("The earned income tax
credit (EITC) is considerably better than the minimum wage as a device for both
progressive redistribution and encouraging workforce participation among the poor.").
224. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 120 (1872) (Bradley,
J., dissenting); Wynehamer v. New York, 13 N.Y. 378, 390-Q1 (1856); COOLEY, supra
note 81, at 487-99; see also GILLMAN, supra note 24, at 56-59 (describing Cooley's
views on class legislation); HOVENKANP, supra note 89, at 200-01.
225. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 385, 388 (1798) (Chase, J.).
226. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 49-50; Lessig, supra note 18, at 460-61.
227. See Lessig, supra note 18, at 460-61. See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note
89, at 200-01; SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 49-50; supra notes 88-90, 136-47 (de-
scribing police power as concerned with externality regulation).
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Coast Hotel, which Justice Souter cited in both Glucksberg and
Casey as an example of the proper approach to economic due
process.22 8
Although appealing, this argument falls short as a faithful
translation of the Due Process Clause. As an initial matter, it is
not clear that this rationale for sustaining wage regulation can
be characterized properly as a translation. Poor laws, after all,
have been with us for a long time; they did not spring up shortly
before or after 1937. Moreover, those who wrote and ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment did appreciate the interaction between
contractual liberty and the public fisc. Here, we must look to, of
all places, the common law of trade restraints. Under this body
of law, courts refused to enforce so-called general restraints, that
is, contracts by which an individual agreed not to pursue his or
her calling anywhere within the jurisdiction. 9' The most potent
rationale for such refusal was the fear that individuals, having
contracted away their right to work, would pursue less produc-
tive occupations, or become paupers and, thus, charges of the
state." ° Refusal to enforce these contracts protected the state
from an externality-lower output and higher relief pay-
ments-and thus was consistent with the scope of the police
power.231
228. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399-400 (1937), cited in
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 761 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring); Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861-62 (1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy,
and Souter, JJ.).
229. See Oregon Steam Navigation Co. v. Winsor, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 64, 68-69
(1873) (Bradley, J.); Alger v. Thacher, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 51, 54 (1837).
230. See Union Strawboard Co. v. Bonfield, 61 N.E. 1038, 1040 (IlM. 1901) ("The
state regulates its internal affairs, supports those who become public charges, and is
interested in the industries of its citizens."); Skrainka v. Scharringhausen, 8 Mo.
App. 522, 525-26 (1880) ("When the avenues to trade and employment were impeded
by artificial barriers, so that if one engaged not to practice his craft, no other occu-
pation was free to him, and he was likely to remain an idle and useless, and to be-
come a dangerous member of society, the court looked with grave displeasure upon
any agreement by which one bound himself not to exercise his trade or mys-
tery. . ."); CHARLES FisK BEACH, SR., A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MONOPOLIES AND
INDuSTRIAL TRUSTS 108 (1898) (noting that the law against general trade restraints
"takes account of the interest of the community in providing that it shall not be de-
prived of the benefit of his business, or exposed to the burden of his support, as a
result of his lack of employment"). One nineteenth-century commentator traced the
law of trade restraints' concern with pauperism to fifteenth-century England. See 2
THEOPHILOUS PARSONS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 254-58 (3d ed. 1857).
231. See Winsor, 87 U.S. at 68 (stating that "general restraints" injured the public
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The Lochner Justices presumably understood the law of trade
restraints as well as the link between contractual liberty and
the public fisc. Yet, even when advocates of minimum wage laws
pointed out that the alternative to such regulation was state
expenditure, the Court balked at validating such interference
with private agreements..22 There is, after all, an important
distinction between the law of trade restraints and minimum
wage laws. Where trade restraints are concerned, there is a
clear basis for treating the parties in question as the source of
harm. They have, after all, refused to work and now come to the
state for assistance. Alternatively, where wages are concerned
the employer has done no such thing. Instead, the employer has
simply hired labor at a price that the market will bear, and is no
more or less the source of the drain on the public fisc, than the
grocer who has refused to give these same individuals food for a
reduced price. Requiring the employer to bear the brunt of any
"externality" appears, in a word, random, maybe even "arbi-
trary."23 3 Indeed, the rationale for forcing an employer to bear
such a burden would prove too much, justifying, as it would, a
translation of the Takings Clause that allowed the state to pro-
tect the fisc by confiscating the home of a rich man and transfer-
ring it to a pauper.2 34 Treating a low wage as producing an
externality can hardly be described as a "translation"; it is in-
by depriving it of "the restricted party's industry"); Meese, supra note 135, at 13-14
(analogizing refusal to enforce general restraints to police power regulation).
232. See Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 528-29 (1923) (reproducing ar-
guments of the United States). As Justice Stone put it, dissenting from the Court's
decision to void New York's minimum wage, one year before West Coast Hotel:
In the years which have intervened since the Adkins case .. . [wie
have had opportunity to perceive more clearly that a wage insuffi-
cient to support the worker does not visit its consequences upon him
alone; that it may affect profoundly the entire economic structure of
society and ... that it casts on every taxpayer, and on government
itself, the burden of solving problems of poverty, in subsistence,
health, and morals of large numbers the community.
Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 635 (1936) (Stone, J., dissent-
ing). The Court, however, disagreed.
233. This, of course, was one of Justice Sutherland's many answers to those who
sought to justify minimum wages for women on the grounds that higher wages
would lead women toward chastity and good health. See Adkins, 261 U.S. at 555-59.
234. GILLMAN, supra note 24, at 46-47, 49-60 (concludfng that such a statute
would be outside the police power as conceived by antebellum courts).
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stead a repudiation of the principle articulated by Bradley, Coo-
ley, and others.
Still, defenders of West Coast Hotel have continued to press
the argument that forcing employers to compensate the public
for this "externality" is not arbitrary. If employees do not earn
enough to feed themselves, these advocates point out, presum-
ably they will not be able to work at all. By requiring the state
to aid the underpaid from the public fisc, protection for liberty of
contract essentially subsidizes employers who pay low wages." 5
Requiring an employer to pay a living wage, they argue, elimi-
nates this subsidy and thus qualifies as a valid police regulation.
Here again, the conclusion that the failure to impose a mini-
mum wage is the equivalent of a subsidy seems to require a
rejection of any coherent principle supporting liberty of con-
tract.216 There is no reason to assume that employers are the
only individuals who benefit from the labor of their employees.
Customers also benefit from this labor which, after all, creates
the products that consumers purchase. Moreover, most custom-
ers are so-called "inframarginal consumers" who pay less for a
product than they receive in utility from it. 237 Failure to require
a living wage for employees is as much a "subsidy" to the gener-
al consuming public-who pay a price that is a function of wag-
es-as it is for employers. As a result, assigning to the employer
the burden of the employee's support appears arbitrary after all.
In light of the onerous effects of minimum wage legislation de-
235. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 46 ("In West Coast Hotel, however, it is the
failure of a state to have minimum wage legislation that amounts to a subsidy-this
time, from the public to the employer."); Thomas Reed Powell, Judiciality of Mini-
mum-Wage Legislation, 37 HARV. L. REV. 545, 565-66 (1924) ("The conception that
the need of the employee to live in health is 'extraneous' to the employment is suffi-
ciently answered by pointing out that only by living in health can she furnish the
labor which he chooses to use.... To say that the responsibility of the employer is
in no sense 'peculiar' overlooks the fact that he alone is making use of the labor of
the employee."); see also West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937)
(noting that although regulation infringes on liberty, it may be justified to protect
the community).
236. Cf. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 760 (1997) (Souter, J., concur-
ring) (stating that principle of liberty of contract announced by Allgeyer was "unob-
jectionable).
237. See APIEN ALCHIAN & WILLIAM ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION: THEORY
AND USE 22-23 (1969).
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scribed above, such an abridgement of contractual liberty is an
unduly restrictive method of achieving the objective in question. s
Ultimately, however, not much turns on the outcome of this
argument. The "realization," if it is that, that firms are "subsi-
dized" by state assistance to their employees does not justify
plenary legislative control of wages, let alone the general author-
ity to abridge liberty of contract and liberty of occupation. In-
stead, it merely supports interference with wages to the extent
necessary to ensure that employees are fit to work, and nothing
more. 23 1 In other words, although West Coast Hotel may have
properly overruled Adkins, it did not, and based on its rationale
could not, overrule Lochner or any liberty of occupation case not
involving an attempt to require a subsistence wage. 4 °
238. See supra notes 183-87 (describing tendency of minimum wage to price un-
skilled workers out of the labor market).
239. Cf. SUNSTEIN, supra note 6, at 50-51 (noting that West Coast Hotel deter-
mined that the proper baseline was one in which employees received a living wage).
240. Of course, to the extent that certain occupations are dangerous and the state
has in place systems to compensate those who are injured, the state may well have
an interest in regulating the terms of employment. After all, individuals who know
they will be compensated if injured will be less likely to negotiate for contractual
protection against dangerous conditions. Cf. Meese, supra note 135, at 21-22 (arguing
that the rule against general restraints was designed to redress market failure that
arose given the availability of state assistance).
This recognition, however, does not justify the wholesale repudiation of liberty
of contract. Indeed, the Lochner Court recognized just such a rationale for infringing
liberty of contract, and would have sustained the law in question if, in fact, the
State had shown that maximum hour laws were necessary to protect the health of
the employees involved. See New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 206
(1917) ("The subject-matter in respect of which freedom of contract is restricted is
the matter of compensation for human life or limb lost or disability incurred in the
course of hazardous employment, and the public has a direct interest in this as af-
fecting the common welfare."); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 396-97 (1898) ("The
State still retains an interest in [the miner's] welfare, however reckless he may be.
The whole is no greater than the sum of all the parts, and when the individual
health, safety, and welfare are sacrificed or neglected, the State must suffer." (quot-
ing lower court opinion)). Of course, the Lochner Court may have erred when it held
that baking was not an unhealthy occupation, or that health concerns could be ad-
dressed via a less restrictive means. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 65-74
(1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The fact that the Lochner Court may have drawn the
line in the wrong place does not mean that there was or is no line to be drawn.
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V. THE BABY AND THE BATHWATER
This Article thus far has evaluated and rejected each of the
translations suggested or adumbrated by Justice Souter in
Glucksberg and Casey as justification for the refusal to protect
economic liberties under the aegis of substantive due process.
Some may take issue with portions of the reasoning employed
herein; others may reject most or all of it. Ultimately, however,
whether one accepts or rejects the arguments offered thus far is
in part beside the point, as none of Justice Souter's suggested
translations can justify the abandonment of economic liberty
generally.
Each of the translations discussed in this Article purports to
justify the abandonment of liberty of contract as deployed in
cases such as Lochner and Adkins to thwart regulation of wages
and other aspects of the employment relationship. Yet, as noted
earlier, liberty of contract was simply derivative of a larger
right, liberty of occupation, deemed by Thomas Cooley, Justice
Bradley, and the Wynehamer decision to be part of the liberty
protected against arbitrary abridgement under the Due Process
Clause.241 Any argument for abandoning "economic due process"
in its entirety must do more than undermine the results in
Lochner and Adkins: it must also explain why, for instance, the
state has the authority to prevent an individual from pursuing
his or her chosen occupation, or to unduly interfere with that
pursuit. 42
Justice Souter, it should be emphasized, has simply not of-
fered any such explanation. Neither the Glucksberg nor the
Casey opinion suggested a rationale for abandoning liberty of
occupation in its entirety. This failure is not surprising. Al-
though the Justice seemed to be aware in Glucksberg that eco-
nomic due process had its origin in the sort of liberty of occupa-
241. See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
242. Cf City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 306 (1976) (sustaining ordi-
nance that excluded recent entrants in the push-cart vending business); Williamson
v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) (upholding a law regulating the practice of
opticians); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947) (sustain-
ing Louisiana law delegating control over entry into harbor pilot profession to incum-
bent pilots who typically excluded individuals who were not their relatives).
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tion championed by Justice Bradley in the Slaughter-House Cas-
es,24 he persisted in his assertion that economic due process
consisted simply of the aggressive scrutiny of laws regulating
the employment relationship under the doctrine of liberty of
contract.' Similar narrow characterizations of the doctrine are
advanced by others hostile to the protection of economic liberty.'
This oversight has important implications for the success of
Justice Souter's attempt to explain cases such as West Coast
Hotel and Carolene Products as faithful applications of the origi-
nal conception of the doctrine of substantive due process. Close
analysis of the sort of translations offered or adumbrated by
Justice Souter suggests that none of them even purports to ex-
plain why the abridgement of liberty of occupation falls within
the police power and thus constitutes "due process of law" as
understood by the Framers. None of the rationales for abandon-
ing Lochner or Adkins canvassed in this Article support the
failure to grant substantive due process protection to the right of
an individual to pursue his or her calling, or the right to engage
in a business that is not harmful to the public.'
Consider in this regard Carolene Products, which Justice
Souter cited as evincing the proper approach to substantive due
process.247 There, the Court evaluated a federal statute banning
the sale of so-called filled milk, a mixture of skim milk and vege-
243. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 759 (1997) (Souter, J., concur-
ring) (describing Justice Bradley's dissent in the Slaughter-House Cases as advocat-
ing protection of liberty of occupation).
244. See id. at 761 (Souter, J., concurring) (asserting that Adkins and Lochner ex-
emplified "deviant economic due process cases"); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 861-62 (1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter, JJ.) (assert-
ing that Lochner and Adkins exemplified the Lochner Era's protection for economic
interests).
245. Professor Sunstein, for instance, describes the era of economic due process
without mentioning liberty of occupation: "In the so-called Lochner period, covering
1905 to 1937, the Supreme Court struck down a large number of state laws at-
tempting to regulate relations between employers and employees." SUNSTEIN, supra
note 6, at 40, 45.
246. See Michael J. Phillips, Entry Restrictions in the Lochner Court, 4 GEO. MA-
SON L. REV. 405, 415-16 (1996) (suggesting that repudiation of Lochner due to "un-
equal bargaining power" did not justify repudiation of economic liberty generally).
247. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 766 (Souter, J., concurring) (citing United States
v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938)); see also supra note 87 and accom-
panying text.
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table oil, thus putting an entire class of entrepreneurs out of
business.2 8 In a decision most constitutional scholars have
deemed "easy,"249 the Court sustained this abridgement of occu-
pational liberty, purportedly on the grounds that it furthered the
health of consumers.5 As one scholar has shown, however, the
statute in question was unrelated to any bona fide health con-
cerns but was instead a thinly disguised effort by the dairy in-
dustry to destroy a more nutritious and inexpensive competing
product.251 It is difficult to take the Court's suggestion to the
contrary seriously.2 Carolene Products, of course, paved the
way for many other similar decisions validating arbitrary limits
on occupational liberty. In Ferguson v. Skupra,2 5 for instance,
the Court sustained a statute that excluded non-lIwyers from
the occupation of debt-adjusting." 4 Similarly, in New Orleans v.
Dukes, 55 the court sustained an ordinance that excluded recent
entrants from the push-cart vending business, leaving the busi-
ness in the hands of two individuals.5 Such limits, it seems,
248. See Geoffrey P. Miller, The True Story of Carolene Products, 1987 SuP. CT.
REv. 397, 398.
249. See id. at 398, nn.12-14 (collecting quotations of scholars calling the decision
"easy," "straightforward," and "unexceptional").
250. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
251. As Professor Miller has put it:
If the preference embodied by this statute was not 'naked,' it was
clothed in only gossamer rationalizations. The consequence of the
decision was to expropriate the property of a lawful and beneficial
industry; to deprive working and poor people of a healthful, nutri-
tious, and low cost food, and to impair the health of the nation's
children by encouraging the use as baby food of a sweetened con-
densed milk product that was 42 percent sugar.
Miller, supra note 248, at 399; see also SIEGAN, supra note 4, at 188-89 (suggesting
that the law was passed to placate "the milk bloc").
252. See Miller, supra note 248, at 399 ("It is difficult to believe that members of
the Court were unaware of the true motivation behind this legislation.").
253. 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
254. See id. at 732-33.
255. 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
256. See i&. at 305; see also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S.
456, 473-74 (1981) (sustaining state law that banned sale of milk in certain plastic
containers despite finding by state courts that the law was motivated by desire to
protect economic interests of local dairies); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483
(1955) (sustaining a law regulating the practice of opticians); Kotch v. Board of Riv-
er Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 557-64 (1947) (sustaining a state law regulat-
ing entry into the harbor pilot profession); Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. Western Ref. &
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simply cannot be squared with the conception of liberty em-
braced by the sources on which Justice Souter relied for the
existence of substantive due process.257 Instead, they would be
deemed "arbitrary and unjust laws made in the interest of a few
scheming individuals."258
None of the various translations advanced in support of the
repudiation of Lochner and Adkins purport to justify the Court's
failure to void this sort of naked abridgement of the harmless
businesses involved in Carolene Products and its progeny. There
can be no assertion, for example, that eliminating an entire
industry somehow enhances the bargaining position of consum-
ers vis a vis sellers of dairy products.2 9 To the contrary, the
enactment, like other state-imposed restrictions on entry, likely
raised consumer prices.26 0 Nor can there be any assertion that
the statute, passed well before the Depression, was a method of
ensuring macro-economic stability.
Indeed, many of the translations advanced to justify abandon-
ment of liberty of contract actually buttress the case for protect-
ing liberty of occupation in cases such as Carolene Products. For
instance, by eliminating the filled milk industry, Congress likely
threw thousands of individuals out of work, rendering them
burdens on the community as a whole. Moreover, filled milk was
a less expensive substitute for condensed milk, thereby allowing
Bond Assoc., 313 U.S. 236 (1941) (sustaining price regulation of apparently com-
petitive business). To be sure, decisions such as Dukes and Kotch relied upon the
Equal Protection Clause, and not the Due Process Clause. Still, each decision rested
upon an explicit or implicit assumption that the pursuit of one's chosen occupation is
not an important liberty. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-04
(1976); Kotch, 330 U.S. at 557-64. This assumption, of course, can be traced to
Carolene Products. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154
(1937).
257. Cf. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 116 (1872) (Bradley,
J., dissenting); COOLEY, supra note 81, at 357 (arguing that a law designed to trans-
fer wealth from one group to another could not constitute due process of law).
258. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 120.
259. See supra notes 136-47 (canvassing sources suggesting that Lochner and
Adkins were incorrect given presence of unequal bargaining power).
260. See Miller, supra note 248, at 427 (pointing out that even though the statute
increased costs to Carolene Products, it also eliminated Carolene Products' competi-
tion). See generally Walter Gellhorn, The Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U.
CHI. L. REV. 6 (1976) (noting that licensing of professions is often accompanied by
undesirable consequences).
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the poor to stretch their food dollars farther and enhance their
health.26 ' Not only did the law in question destroy the occupa-
tional liberty of thousands, it also created externalities of the
sort that opponents of Lochner have relied upon to justify the
repudiation of liberty of contract. 2
Of course, not all manufacturers of filled milk became penuri-
ous as a result of the statute validated in Carolene Products.
Presumably, some were able to find employment elsewhere, in
callings other than the one they had chosen initially. Yet, to the
extent such employment involved working for others and not for
themselves, the law in question resulted in "wage slavery" of the
type that to some justified the abridgements of liberty of con-
tract like those voided in Lochner and Adkins.2" In other words,
to the extent the "liberty" protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment consisted solely of the liberty of an entrepreneur to ply his
or her trade, a prohibition on the sale of filled milk would seem
to be the most blatant possible violation of its terms.2 4
261. One cannot help but recall Justice McReynolds's powerful dissent in Nebbia
v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), where the Court sustained state regulations fixing
the retail price of milk at above-market prices:
[The statute] imposes direct and arbitrary burdens upon those al-
ready seriously impoverished with the alleged immediate design of
affording special benefits to others.... A superabundance [of milk];
but no child can purchase from a willing storekeeper below the fig-
ure appointed by three men at headquarters!
Id. at 557-58 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
262. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text (explaining that the "police
power" consisted of the authority to regulate externalities).
263. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
264. Cf The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 119-20 (1872)
(Bradley, J., dissenting) ("To compel a butcher, or rather all the butchers of a large
city and an extensive district, to slaughter their cattle in another person's slaughter-
house and pay him a toll therefor, is such a restriction upon the trade as materially
to interfer with its prosecution. It is onerous, unreasonable, arbitrary, and unjust. It
has none of the qualities of a police regulation."); People v. Marx, 99 N.Y. 377, 385-
86 (1885) (voiding law similar to that sustained in Carolene Products).
In Marx, it should be noted, the New York Court of Appeals cited Justice
Field's dissent as persuasive authority for the "firmly settled" proposition that "it is
one of the fundamental rights and privileges of every American citizen to adopt and
follow such lawful industrial pursuit, not injurious to the community, as he may see
fit." Marx, 99 N.Y. at 386 (citing the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at
106 (Field, J., dissenting). The court went on to conclude:
Who will have the temerity to say that these constitutional princi-
ples are not violated by an enactment which absolutely prohibits an
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Thus, even if it were appropriate for the Court to overrule
Lochner and Adkins, there was no justification for contempora-
neously abandoning that line of decisions carefully scrutinizing
statutes abridging individual occupational liberty.265 Absent
some new forms of "translation" different from those suggested
by Justice Souter and others, the departure from these decisions
cannot be explained as an act of fidelity to the original meaning
of the Due Process Clause, if that provision is deemed to have a
substantive component.
CONCLUSION
Unlike some devotees of substantive due process, Justice
Souter has expressly grounded his support for that doctrine in
the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ironically,
however, the Justice has made it clear that he would abjure any
protection for economic liberties, even though it appears that
those who wrote and ratified the amendment deemed such
rights an important component of "liberty" that could be
abridged only in narrow circumstances. This selective enforce-
ment of the Due Process Clause raises serious questions about
Justice Souter's claim that, in conducting substantive due pro-
cess review, courts are merely carrying out the mandate of the
Constitution's text in a manner consistent with "reasoned judg-
ment" and not "will."
For some scholars, this apparent inconsistency is easy to ex-
plain. Whatever the original meaning of the Due Process Clause,
important branch of industry for the sole reason that it competes
with another, and may reduce the price of an article of food for the
human race.
Id. at 385.
265. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 279-80 (1932) (void-
ing state limits on entry into the ice business); Louis K Liggett Co. v. Baldridge,
278 U.S. 105, 113 (1928) (voiding state statute prohibiting chain drug stores); Adans
v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 596-97 (1917) (voiding state limits on conduct of employ-
ment agencies); Smith v. Texas, 233 U.S. 630, 642 (1914) (voiding a statute that
made it unlawful to serve as a train conductor without two years prior experience
as a brakeman or conductor); see also Marx, 99 N.Y. at 387 (voiding a law that for-
bade sale of dairy products produced from adulterated milk or cream); In re Jacobs,
98 N.Y. 98, 113-15 (1885) (voiding a law that forbade manufacture of cigars in tene-
ment houses).
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they say, the events of 1937 amended the Constitution so as to
make it clear that the sort of economic liberties recognized by
Lochner and its progeny should not receive constitutional protec-
tion. This "constitutional moment," they emphasize, did not
reject substantive due process as such, but instead left the Court
free to recognize new rights outside the economic arena.
In attempting to justify his failure to accord protection to
economic liberties, Justice Souter has not relied on the occur-
rence of a constitutional moment; nor has he questioned the
commitment of the Framers to economic liberties. Instead, he
has attempted to portray the abandonment of economic due
process as a faithful implementation of the Fourteenth
Amendment in light of subsequent developments. Such an ap-
proach, which scholars have referred to as "translation," is an
accepted method of ensuring that values enshrined by the Fram-
ers are kept up to date in a rapidly changing society. Various
translations, Justice Souter has argued, justify the sort of le-
nient protection for economic liberties evinced by cases such as
West Coast Hotel and Carolene Products.
As this Article has shown, each of the translations suggested
by Justice Souter and others is of questionable validity. More-
over, even if taken on their own terms, the suggested transla-
tions do not justify the repudiation of liberty of contract as such;
instead, they simply mandate the repudiation of particular ap-
plications of it. Finally, even if one or more of these suggested
translations does, somehow, justify the wholesale abandonment
of liberty of contract, none of them even purports to offer a ratio-
nale for failing to protect occupational liberty of the sort that
initially formed the basis for liberty of contract.
Justice Souter and other proponents of "translation" thus have
failed to offer a convincing rationale for their admitted unwill-
ingness to protect the sort of economic liberties valued by the
Framers. Unless some new explanation is forthcoming, the re-
fusal to enforce those rights will necessarily call into question
the Justice's assertion that the current scope of liberty protected
under the aegis of substantive due process can be explained as a
faithful application of the original meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Absent an embrace of the theory of constitutional
moments, or abandonment of substantive due process altogether,
1999]
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the Justice and others who take a similar approach will properly
be subject to the charge that they are exercising will and not
judgment.
